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Abstract 
 
Spurred on by the controversy over contraception, the twentieth century became 
one of most eventful for the history of Catholic thought on human sexuality.  The 
Catholic Church in this century experienced the rise and eventual dominance, at least at 
the level of the Magisterium, of a personalist approach to marriage and sexual ethics, an 
approach which sought to treat of these subjects from the perspective of their relation to 
personal values, especially the value of love.  Of those figures who were most crucial in 
the development of such a personalist approach, one was Karol Wojtyła.  As bishop, 
archbishop, cardinal and finally pope, Wojtyła (John Paul II) would be involved in some 
of the most important events of this history, such as the drafting of Vatican II’s 
Gaudium et Spes and the controversy surrounding Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae. 
This study is intended to further an understanding of Wojtyła’s role in this 
history by investigating his thought on human sexuality.  Accurate interpretation of his 
actions would require knowledge about his convictions, beliefs and reasons for them.  
This study, however, limits itself to investigating only one of Wojtyła’s works, Love and 
Responsibility, and to asking one specific question of it, what relation is understood to 
exist between love and sexuality. 
This investigation leads to several important conclusions.  First, Wojtyła has a 
definite and reasoned belief that sexuality is necessarily related to love.  Second, his 
understanding of sexuality and its relation to love depends on his belief about the nature 
of love.  Third, Wojtyła believes that human sexuality is related to love because a) it is 
the sexuality of a person and a person is the sort of entity which is able to love and 
ought to be loved, b) by virtue of the sexual urge attraction (a form of love) arises very 
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easily, c) by sex (male and female) being a limitation or imbalance a special basis is 
created for love-as-desire (another form of love), and finally d) by sexual intercourse 
being a union of bodies, intercourse both expresses “betrothed love” (yet another form 
of love) and gives it an added perfection. 
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Introduction 
 
On December 7, 1965 Paul VI promulgated the Pastoral Constitution on the 
Church in the Modern World, the document commonly known, by virtue of its opening 
words, as Gaudium et Spes.  A wide variety of issues were addressed in it; one of these 
was marriage.  In preparation for the document the bishops at the council, despite some 
opposition, rejected certain aspects of traditional terminology and chose to cast their 
treatment of marriage in what might be called “personalistic” terms.1  Gaudium et Spes 
spoke of marriage as an “intimate union”2 rather than a contract3, and repeatedly stated 
that it was created by the mutual self-giving of the spouses.4  Within the relatively short 
section dedicated to marriage, the term love appeared forty-seven times.5  Gaudium et 
Spes did not pass over marriage’s orientation towards procreation, but attempted to 
integrate it with the personal values and ends inherent in marriage. 
 Two and a half years later on July 25, 1968 Humanae Vitae was published.  
Commenting on the modern context surrounding the problem of contraception, Paul VI 
noted that among the changes of “considerable importance” were “a new 
understanding… of conjugal love in marriage and the relationship of conjugal acts to 
                                                
1 Theodore Davey, “Marriage and Sexuality” in Modern Catholicism: Vatican II and After ed. Adrian 
Hastings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 267. 
2 Gaudium et Spes 48 as found in The Documents of Vatican II second edition, trans. Joseph Gallagher 
(New York: Guild Press; Association Press, 1966). 
3 Davey 267. 
4 Gaudium et Spes 47-52  
5 Ibid. 
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love.”6  The pope then proceeded to reassert the Church’s condemnation of 
contraception and provide a “personalistic” explanation.  The procreative significance of 
sexual intercourse was inseparably bound with the unitive significance (love); to 
contradict the former was to contradict the latter.7  The encyclical also continued to use 
Gaudium et Spes’s terminology; marriage was referred to as a union of persons which 
was the result of mutual giving of self.8 
 The emerging “personalistic” approach to marriage and sexuality, an approach 
which above all was characterized by a desire to give love a central place in marriage, 
was cemented by John Paul II.  His pontificate began with a five year long series of 
general audiences which developed a “theology of the body”.  The depth of personalistic 
analysis given within the series to marriage and sexuality was staggering.   In the years 
that followed, the pope would speak frequently on marital and sexual issues.  The 
document regarded as the most important and authoritative on marriage was, however, 
promulgated within the timeframe of the “theology of the body series”; this was the 
1981 apostolic exhortation Familiaris Consortio.9  Personalistic emphasis on love, gift 
of self, and (comm)union of persons occurs throughout it. 
 Finally, Benedict XVI in his first encyclical Deus Caritas Est continued the 
modern papal tradition of associating love with sexuality.  Considering “the vast 
semantic range of the word ‘love’”, he noted that among the wide variety of meanings 
“one in particular stands out: love between man and woman, where body and soul are 
                                                
6 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae 2, <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html> (24 July 2006). 
7 Ibid. 12 
8 Ibid. 8 
9 Ronald Lawler, Joseph Boyle, and William E. May, Catholic Sexual Ethics: A Summary, Explanation, 
and Defense second edition (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 1998) 25. 
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inseparably joined and human beings glimpse an apparently irresistible promise of 
happiness.  This would seem to be the very epitome of love; all other kinds of love 
immediately seem to fade in comparison.”10  He then proceeded to examine the relation 
between agape and eros, arguing that Christian agape rescues and elevates eros.11  
While Benedict employed a terminology different from that found in Gaudium et Spes, 
Humanae Vitae, and John Paul II’s writings, the continuity of the association of love 
with sexuality is unmistakable.   
 In their brief review on the history of Church teaching on marriage and sexuality, 
Ronald Lawler, Joseph Boyle and William E. May, claim that “[t]oday it has become 
clearer than ever before that Christian sexual morality is no more and no less than the 
implication of the logic of love.”12  That a change in the way that the Church speaks 
about marriage has occurred during the twentieth century seems fairly evident.  To 
confirm it one only needs to compare any post-Vatican II papal document on the subject 
with the treatment of any nineteenth century Catholic theologian.  Vatican II’s Gaudium 
et Spes, of course, was not the spontaneous source of this new approach; it was rather 
the point at which acceptance of the approach began to rapidly accelerate. 
The immediate origins of the present personalistic approach are to be found 
largely in the first half of the twentieth century, but these in turn are due to nineteenth 
century developments.  The dominant figure in nineteenth century Catholic moral 
theology was Alphonsus Liguori.13  During his lifetime (1696-1787) Alphonsus was the 
                                                
10 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est 2, < http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/ 
encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html> (24 July 2006). 
11 Ibid. 3-11 
12 Catholic Sexual Ethics 67 
13 This is a constant impression given by John T. Noonan in Chapters 12 and 13 of Contraception 
(Cambridge, Maaschusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966).  Alphsonsus’ critical importance for 19th 
century moral theology is commonly admitted, though sometimes indirectly.  Adrian Hastings says that 
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subject of bitter conservative criticism, but after his death he became “unassailable.”14  
A lawyer by training, Alphonsus was not so much an innovator, as he was an ardent and 
intelligent defender of opinions proposed by other theologians.15  When it came to 
sexual matters, he rejected traditional Augustinian doctrine,16 and particularly its claim 
that sexual intercourse could be free of sin only if procreation was being consciously 
sought, and instead supported theologians like the Jesuit Thomas Sanchez (1550-
1610).17  Due largely to Alphonsus’ post-mortem authority, Augustinianism in sexual 
ethics was, at least according to John T. Noonan Jr., “banished”18 and the anti-
                                                                                                                                          
Alphsonsus was the “supreme master” of the manual tradition of moral theology which “dominated 
Catholicism to an extraordinary extent between the 17th and 20th centuries” (“Morality” in The Oxford 
Companion to Christian Thought, 450).  L. Vereecke writes that “Among the major events of the history 
of the Church in the 19th century was the progressive rallying of moralists and the clergy to the moral 
thinking of St. Alphonsus” and “It can be said that the influence of St. Alphsonsus on Catholicism in the 
19th century was very generally and very deeply felt” (“Alphonsus Liguori, St., in New Catholic 
Encyclopedia 2nd ed. vol. 1, 311-312).  Servais Pinckaers presents Alphsonsus as the highpoint of the 
manualist tradition and the hero who resolved the dispute over probabilism.  He also draws attention to the 
Church’s approval of Alphsonsus’ theology for any confessor, the declaration of Alphonsus as a Doctor 
the Church in 1871 and Alphonsus’ status as patron of moralists (The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. 
Mary Thomas Noble, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995, 276-277). 
14 John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception: A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and 
Canonists, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966) 396.  
15 Ibid. 320 
16 “Augustinian Doctrine” in the history of Catholic theological treatment of marriage has its source in 
Augustine’s writings but is not necessarily to be identified with his thought.  “Augustinianism” in sexual 
and marital matters is generally characterized by a strong emphasis on the good of procreation, the good 
which married couples ought to be seeking when they are engaging in intercourse.  This rational and good 
end makes up for the means.  The only other rational good which may be adopted as a motive for 
engaging in intercourse is the avoidance of infidelity through the quieting of sexual desire.  Generally 
Augustinians have found this motive to involve venial sin if the potentially unfaithful person is oneself, 
but virtuous if it is one’s spouse.  Pleasure itself, as opposed to the quieting of desire through pleasure, 
does not qualify as a good end and is regarded, with varying severity, as an illicit motive for seeking 
intercourse. 
17 Ibid. 321-330 
18 Ibid. 329.  Liguori’s contribution to the disappearance of Augustinianism in sexual ethics probably bore 
some connection to his role in the decline of Jansenism.  L. Vereecke says that Alphonsus “gave 
Jansenism in its practical form a blow from which it could not recover” (“Alphonsus Liguori, St.” in The 
New Catholic Encyclopedia vol. 1, 312).  Jansenism stemmed originally from Bishop Jansenius’ work 
Augustinus and was generally characterized by moral rigorism.  Jansenists usually took the Jesuits as their 
enemy; Blaise Pascal, a Jansenist writer, attacked Jesuit moralist for their treatment of marriage and 
sexuality (Les Lettres provincial in Oeuvres completes, ed. Fortunat Strowski, vol. II,  
Paris 1926, 9). 
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Augustinian approach to marriage and sexuality which had been growing since the 
beginning of the seventeenth century19 became standard. 
 Of those opinions of Thomas Sanchez supported by Liguori one was that sexual 
acts short of intercourse and ejaculation were, even if there was the risk of ejaculation, 
lawful between spouses “whenever there was an urgent need for showing signs of 
affection for the fostering of mutual love.”20  While neither Sanchez nor Liguori 
suggested that the fostering of mutual love could also be a lawful motive to sexual 
intercourse, the idea seemed to logically follow.  In 1852 John Gury, S.J., took this step 
in his Compendium of Moral Theology; one of the lawful motives for seeking 
intercourse was declared to be “the desire of fostering or bringing about decent 
friendship, of manifesting or promoting conjugal affection, and so forth.”21  In the 1874 
edition the term friendship was replaced by love.22  This was the first time a Catholic 
theologian directly associated love with sexual intercourse. 
 The nineteenth century also contained the origins of that controversy which 
would frame so much of the discussion of marriage and sexuality in the following years.  
In 1798 Thomas Malthus, an Anglican clergyman, published An Essay on the Principle 
of Population in which he argued that population left unchecked would grow 
geometrically while food production would only grow arithmetically.23  Although 
Malthus did not advocate artificial birth control of any kind, his essay would soon 
become the foundation for a birth control movement which promoted various forms of 
                                                
19 Ibid. 323 
20 Alphonso Marie de Liguori, Theologia Moralis (Paris: Ludovicum Bives, 1872-1875) 6.934.  My 
translation of “aliquando adsit urgens causa ostendendi indicia affectus ad fovendum mutuum amorem”. 
21 John Gury, Compendium of Moral Theology (Turin, 1852), “Marriage,” no. 688 as quoted in 
Contraception 491. 
22 Noonan 492 
23 Thomas Malthus, Population: The First Essay, ([Ann Arbor]: University of Michigan Press, 1959), 5. 
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contraception.  The movement was particularly English in its origins; it bore significant 
ties to the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill and publicly advocated birth control in 
England in 1820 and the United States in 1830.24  While the movement enjoyed varying 
success during the three quarters of the century, the last quarter marked a major turning 
point and it was then that its major victories in public acceptance began to be made.25 
 The Church’s concern over contraception for the first three quarters of the 
century was largely limited to France where the practice of coitus interruptus 
(withdrawal from intercourse before ejaculation) was “rampant”26 and “widespread”.27  
So as not to destroy the good faith of ignorant penitents, a policy of silence generally 
prevailed.28  Arguments against contraception continued to appear in theological works 
but these arguments were “traditionalist rather than closely reasoned”29, “perfunctory 
and undeveloped.”30  Matters changed in the last quarter of the century as a result of the 
pontificate of Leo XIII, the revival of Thomism, the success of the birth control 
movement, and the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war, a defeat which was 
regarded by some in the Church as the consequence of a low population stemming from 
the widespread contraceptive practices.  It was at this time that the Church became the 
                                                
24 Ibid. 392-393 
25 Ibid. 406-407 
26 Ibid. 416 
27 Andrew Dutney, “Contraception” in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought ed. by Adrian 
Hastings, Alistair Mason, and Hugh Pyper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 134 
28 Noonan. 400-405.  Coitus interruptus was so widespread that priests could usually assume that a 
married penitent was practicing it.  If the penitent did not confess to it, the priest, suspecting its presence, 
could either interrogate the penitent or remain silent.  The danger with interrogation was that if the 
penitent was practicing coitus interruptus but was ignorant of its sinful nature, then the new knowledge of 
its sinfulness could lead to serious martial conflict and have the result that the penitent ceased to come to 
confession anymore.  A policy of silence was generally taken with the hope that by progress in the 
spiritual life the practice of coitus interruptus would be eventually abandoned. 
29 Ibid. 405 
30 Ibid. 406 
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“active and tireless adversary of contraception."31  In 1880 Leo XIII issued Arcanum 
Divinae Sapientiae.  This encyclical was a sort of “opening move”.  Contraception was 
never explicitly mentioned; the pope focused his attention rather on asserting the 
sacredness and divine origin of marriage and establishing the Church’s competence to 
speak on marital matters.32  Direct papal denunciation of contraception in an encyclical 
would have to wait until December 31, 1930 when Pius XI issued Castii Conubii.  Four 
and a half months earlier the Anglican Church at its Lambeth Conference had allowed 
for the use of contraception under certain circumstances.33  In the years that followed 
other protestant denominations followed the Anglican lead.  By 1960 virtually all had 
accepted contraception as morally licit.34 
 Within the Catholic Church the controversy would reach its famous climax in 
1968 when Paul VI issued Humanae Vitae.  While Castii Connubii had explicitly 
condemned contraception, there was some question as to what Pius XI particularly had 
in mind; certainly coitus interruptus and the condom, and probably diaphragms and 
postcoital douches as well.35  Not included was the not yet invented progesterone pill.  
When it did emerge in the mid fifties, a discussion extending from 1957-1963 began 
among theologians over whether the pill qualified as contraception.36  In the latter half 
of 1963, however, there began to appear Catholic writers who challenged the Church’s 
                                                
31 Ibid. 404  The Church of course always condemned contraception.  The change which occurred at the 
end of the nineteenth century was a change in “pastoral approach”.  The previous “silence” of the 19th 
century, brought about by concern for not destroying the good faith of a penitent, ended and the Church 
became more and more outspoken about its age-old teaching on contraception.  
32 Ibid. 415-416 
33 The Lambeth Conference, 1930, Resolution 15 
34 Dutney, “Contraception” 134 
35 Noonan. 429 
36 Ibid. 468-475 
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entire teaching on contraception.37  This challenge increased even more in 1966.38  In 
the minds of many Paul VI, in response to the work of the commission on problems of 
population, the family and natality, was not just going to issue a determination on the 
status of the pill, but was going to radically change the Church’s stance on contraception 
in general.  Neither happened; the Church’s condemnation of contraception was 
reasserted and, while not explicitly mentioned, the pill was fairly obviously rejected as a 
legitimate means of regulating birth.  Dissension among theologians followed the 
encyclical, but as far as the Magisterium was concerned the issue was settled. 
 Although the Church’s position on contraception did not change, the controversy 
contributed greatly to the development of doctrine.  Because it was felt to be such a 
pressing issue much more intellectual vigor was directed to the subject of marriage and 
sexuality than had been previously.  When the Church’s teaching was re-examined it 
was also done so within a new context.  Several factors contributed to this context.  The 
nuclear family had emerged as the form of the family most commonly met in the 
Western world.39  There had been advancement in scientific knowledge; notable 
discoveries included the human ovum (1827), the fertility cycle in mammals (1845), and 
the human fertility cycle (1924 and 1929).40  Psychology had also advanced, allowing 
for more speculation on the relation between sexuality and personality.41  For the 
development of personalism in sexuality ethics, though, the most significant aspect of 
the new context was probably that, due largely to the increased status of women, the 
                                                
37 Noonan 512 and Janet E. Smith, Humanae Vitae: A Generation Later (Washington: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1991) 8. 
38 Catholic Sexual Ethics 64 
39 Noonan 479 
40 Ibid. 439-443, Two dates are generally given for the discovery of the human fertility cycle because 
Kyusaku Ogino’s 1924 data was also arrived at independently Hermann Knaus in 1929. 
41 Ibid. 481 
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possibility of marriage being a meeting of equals was much greater and as a result 
Western society had become the first in which individual decision had a major role in 
selection of a marriage partner.42 
  While there had been some development among late nineteenth century 
theologians concerning the relation between love and sexuality,43 the personalistic 
approach really only began after World War I, taking root in Germany under the 
influence of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler.44  Personalism, it 
should be said, is a somewhat loosely used term in philosophy; in general it refers to “a 
philosophical perspective or system for which person is the ontological ultimate and for 
which personality is thus the fundamental explanatory principle.”45  When applied to the 
area of sexuality, personalism usually signifies an intention to view sexuality from the 
perspective of its significance for the person, and to put personal values like freedom, 
goodness, truth, and especially love at the center and to discover the relation that 
sexuality bears to them.  Understood in this way the label “personalism” may be applied 
to theologians and philosophers from a variety of schools.  Among the early Catholic 
“personalists”, the most prominent and important was the phenomenologist Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, student of Edmund Husserl and close friend of Max Scheler.  
Phenomenology, with its interest in describing the experience of a given phenomenon, 
was particularly prone to moving the perspective on sexuality away from the objective 
                                                
42 Ibid.  478 and 532 
43 Francis X. Linsenmann, for example, in 1878 distinguished the subjective purpose of intercourse from 
the objective.  Objectively procreation was the primary purpose; subjectively the purpose was that 
“through the ordered appeasement of the natural drives the spiritual union of the spouses be consolidated”.  
Francis X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie (Freiburg im Breisgau: 1878) 630, as quoted in 
Noonan 494. 
44 Noonan 494 
45 John H. Lavely, “Personalism”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. 6 (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing, 1967) 107. 
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teleology of the generative act and toward the effect which it exerted on the person as a 
whole.  Von Hildebrand’s earliest and best known work on marriage and sexuality, In 
Defense of Purity [Reinheit und Jungfraulichkeit], was published in 1928.  In it he spoke 
of sexual intercourse as “perfect self-surrender and self-revelation”46, claimed that any 
other use of it was “desecration of the other person”47, and distinguished between its 
meaning (love) and its end (procreation).48 
 Castii Connubii followed a few years later.  It did not reject von Hildebrand’s 
work and for the first time in a papal document love was linked to sexual intercourse.49  
The personalistic approach developed steadily after this point.  The next major figure 
was Herbert Doms who in 1935 published The Meaning and End of Marriage [Vom 
Sinn und Zweck der Ehe] which was a development of von Hildebrand’s thought.  
Doms’ work was both influential and heavily criticized.  Significant works from 
theologians such as Bernard Häring (1954), Joseph Fuchs (1960), and Paul Quay (1961), 
followed.  With respect to the contraception controversy these writers and those like 
them characterized contraceptive acts “as selfish, as an exploitation of the spouse, as a 
denial of love, [and] as a destruction of the natural meaning of coitus”.50  They also all 
“appeared to assume that the only lawful intercourse was that in which the person gave 
himself totally”.51  It was their work which culminated in Gaudium et Spes. 52  
                                                
46 Dietrich von Hildebrand, In Defense of Purity (New York, 1931), 36. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 20-22 
49 Pius XI, Castii Connubii 59 <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xi_enc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html> (24 July 2006). 
50 Noonan 523 
51 Ibid.  Noonan published Contraception in 1965, three years before Humanae Vitae.  The personalists 
which he groups together did not all take the same stance in the controversy which followed the 
encyclical.  Von Hildebrand became one of the first public defenders of Humanae Vitae (Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, The Encyclical Humanae Vitae: A Sign of Contradiction in Why Humanae Vitae Was Right: A 
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Interestingly, Augustinian thought, having been “banished” in the nineteenth century, 
returned in the work of many twentieth century personalist writers, although it was 
employed in a very different way than it was previously.53 
 Perhaps the easiest way to misinterpret the modern historical development of 
Catholic teaching on marital and sexual matters and particularly their relation to love, is 
to see the changes exclusively, or almost exclusively, as the result of a desire to appease 
modern sentiments, as a concession to the stance taken on contraception.  Environmental 
factors played an important role, as did the desire for “aggiornamento”54, both in its 
orthodox and unorthodox forms, but the changes also depended to a significant extent on 
the convictions of certain individuals.  That Dietrich von Hildebrand was a philosopher, 
not a theologian, a phenomenologist, not a Neo-Scholastic and “the first married layman 
to make a substantial contribution to Catholic doctrine on marriage”55, owes something 
to the modern context in which he lived.  But as modern as he was, he was also “anxious 
never to say anything that was not in perfect harmony with the teachings of the 
Church”.56  The approach he proposed for sexual ethics cannot be seen as a move from 
traditional rigorism to modern laxity; contraception is utterly condemned, and because 
love is at stake sexual sins of all kinds take on a seriousness which is not to be found in 
                                                                                                                                          
Reader, ed. by Janet E. Smith, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993, 49-82).  Bernard Häring, by contrast 
became one of the main opponents of the papal position. 
52 Enda McDonagh, “The Church in the Modern Work (Gaudium et Spes)”, in Modern Catholicism 105.  
McDonagh says that Gaudium et Spes is “an excellent expression of the theology of marriage that had 
been developing in the Church since the 1940s”. 
53 Catholic Sexual Ethics 55 and Noonan 522-523 
54 Aggiornamento, Italian for “updating” was a term used by John XXIII to describe the task of Vatican II, 
the renewal and updating of the Church’s teaching for the modern world. 
55 Noonan 494-495 
56 Alice von Hildebrand, The Soul of a Lion: Dietrich von Hildebrand (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2000) 212. 
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most previous writers.  Von Hildebrand would later become one of the first public 
defenders of Humanae Vitae.57 
 Von Hildebrand’s concern to be orthodox had one especially interesting 
historical consequence.  Aware of the novelty of his work, he checked his thought with 
his friend Eugenio Pacelli, the Nuncio to Germany.  Pacelli endorsed his views and 
encouraged them.  Von Hildebrand’s influence probably played a significant role in 
Pacelli’s treatment of marital and sexual matters when Pacelli became Pope Pius XII.  It 
was he who first, and quite unexpectedly, lent papal support for the regularization of 
birth through the use of the infertile period.58  Pius XII also condemned artificial 
insemination on personalistic grounds and spoke of sexual intercourse as “the 
expression of the reciprocal gift” which spouses make of themselves to each other.59  
His pronouncements on marriage and sexuality show that it would be wrong to view the 
papacy’s role in twentieth century development of doctrine as simply that of begrudging 
concession, a final assent to what had become universally accepted. 
Dietrich von Hildebrand is undoubtedly one of the most significant individuals 
in the development of personalism in the Catholic Church.  If his influence and effect on 
this history is rivaled by anyone, it can only be by Karol Wojtyła.  The role which 
Wojtyła played was, of course, very different from that of von Hildebrand.  Whereas 
von Hildebrand’s importance primarily lies in his originality, Wojtyła’s lies primarily in 
                                                
57 Dietrich Von Hildebrand, The Encyclical Humanae Vitae: A Sign of Contradiction (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1969). 
58 Support was first publicly given on October 29, 1951 in an address to the Italian Catholic Society of 
Midwives.  Up to this point it was commonly accepted that intercourse during the infertile period was 
lawful, but there was disagreement over whether regularized use of this period could be employed for the 
purpose of the spacing of births.  Pius XII, “Discours Aux Participants du Congrès de l’Union Catholique 
Italienne des Sages-femmes” (29 October 1951) in Documents Pontificaux de Sa Sainteté Pie XII: 1951, 
ed. R. Kothen (Paris: Labergerie, 1952), 470-498.  
59 Ibid. 
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his authority.  The history of Catholic sexual ethics shows that authority, no less than 
originality, is necessary for development.  Augustine combines both elements in 
himself.  Thomas Aquinas, however, makes only a few original contributions, but is 
roughly of equal importance because of the authority attributed to him.  Alphonsus 
Liguori, mentioned earlier, played the crucial role he did by giving his support to 
theologians like Thomas Sanchez; only through the authority attributed to Liguori 
during the nineteenth century did Sanchez’s original thought come to play the role that it 
did.  A parallel can certainly be drawn between Sanchez and Liguori on the one hand 
and von Hildebrand and Wojtyła on the other. 
Wojtyła was an authoritative figure in this field because of the fact and the 
quality of his papacy.  Extending from 1978 to 2005, his reign was the third longest in 
the Church’s history.  His papacy covered much of the period of theological dissent that 
followed Vatican II and Humanae Vitae, and he was one of the most crucial figures in 
the struggle over the interpretation of the council.  As far as sexual matters were 
concerned, he was a novelty; no other pope went out of his way to address such issues to 
the extent that he did.  Marriage and sexuality were more than just objective concerns 
which were to be addressed only when controversy demanded it; Wojtyła brought to the 
papacy an ardent personal interest in the subject.  This is seen best in that he began his 
pontificate with a five year long series of Wednesday addresses on marriage, sexuality 
and the body which was written before his election and intended to be a book.60  The 
Theology of the Body series was to have a twofold effect; first, being such an intense 
personalistic investigation of sexuality, it thoroughly confirmed the development which 
had taken place during the twentieth century, and second, it in turn sparked a new 
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excitement on the topic which would result in a wide range of works by Catholic 
writers.61 
Wojtyła’s contribution to twentieth century development of doctrine did not, 
however, begin with his election to the papacy.  Before he was John Paul II, he was 
Cardinal Wojtyła, “one of the best-known churchmen in the world to his peers in the 
higher leadership of Roman Catholicism.”62  The renown which he had in upper 
hierarchy of the Church was gained during the Second Vatican Council63 and the 
document to which his primary contributions were made was none other than Gaudium 
et Spes.64  A few years earlier, in 1960, Wojtyła had published a book entitled Love and 
Responsibility.  Its teaching on marriage and sexuality accords very much with that 
Gaudium et Spes. 
A bishop and then archbishop during the council, Wojtyła was made a cardinal 
by Paul VI in 1967.  According to George Weigel, Wojtyła was “well-known to the 
Pope as the author of Love and Responsibility.”65  A few year earlier Paul VI had 
assigned him to the Papal Commission for the Study of Problems of the Family, 
Population, and Birth Rate; however, due to the Polish government’s refusal to issue 
him a passport, Wojtyła had been unable to be present at the crucial June 1966 meeting 
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Anthony Missionary Press, 2000).  One indication that there is popular interest in Theology of the Body is 
Christopher West’s recent publication of a commentary on the work, Theology of the Body Explained 
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from which the famous “Majority Report” calling for acceptance of contraception was 
derived.66  This did not stop him from playing a decisive role in the formation of 
Humanae Vitae.  Within his own diocese he set up a commission, in which he 
participated actively, to study the issues being debated by the Papal Commission.67  It 
was with the memorandum of this commission and not the “Majority Report” of the 
Papal Commission that Paul VI sided.  If the claim that sixty percent of the encyclical 
was owing to Wojtyła’s commission is too exaggerated, there are elements within 
Humanae Vitae which almost certainly come from it.68  In addition to all of this, Paul VI 
was reportedly reading Love and Responsibility while he wrote the encyclical and was, 
according to biographer Paul Johnson, heavily influenced by it.69 
Theodore Davey claims that beneath the debate about the terminology which 
was to be used in Gaudium et Spes to speak of marriage there was this fundamental 
question: “has human love a central place in marriage, or is procreation its justifying and 
overriding value?”70  The personalism which has developed in the Church’s teaching on 
marriage is above all else the result of reflection on the relation between sexuality and 
love.  The great changes in the Church’s approach to sexuality which occurred during 
the twentieth century were not simply the result of environmental, sociological factors.  
As we have already seen from the case of Paul VI, who under intense pressure from 
both sides of the contraception debate had to make a final choice of great consequence, 
the changes derived to a great extent from individual decisions and actions.  Personal 
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forces no less than impersonal ones must be given consideration.  To understand a 
person’s actions one must understand what motivated and guided them, and a crucial 
factor in this is what that person believed.  Karol Wojtyła had a critical impact on the 
development of personalism in the Church and personalism was above all a question of 
what place love has in the sexual sphere.  What did he believe to be the relationship 
between love and sexuality?  Interpretation of his actions in the formation of Gaudium et 
Spes, in the Humanae Vitae controversy, and during his pontificate, depend to a great 
extent on the answer to this question. 
This study is intended to further the question, so necessary for a proper 
interpretation of Wojtyła’s actions, of what he believed about sexuality.  A full answer 
to the question would require an investigation into a number of works, not least among 
which would be Theology of the Body and Familiaris Consortio.  Such an investigation 
would be extensive.  This study will restrict its inquiry to asking what understanding of 
love’s relation to sexuality is present in Love and Responsibility.  This will allow us to 
get at the heart of the matter since the question of love’s relation to sexuality is the 
central concern in the development of personalism, and Love and Responsibility is his 
most important work on precisely this subject; while his papal writings, because of the 
authority associated with them, have more potential for influencing the future of the 
Church, Love and Responsibility is more revealing about his understanding of the 
subject because it gives greater attention to the nature of love than any subsequent work, 
and, being published before Vatican II and the Humanae Vitae controversy, helps reveal 
the understanding of sexuality he was to bring to them.71 
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Moreover another reason why Love and Responsibility deserves attention is that 
while its importance is widely admitted by writers concerned with Karol Wojtyła/John 
Paul II’s life and thought, there have been only a few scholars who have done work 
specifically on his thought on sexuality,72 and for those who have, for example Richard 
Hogan and Daryl J. Glick, the focus has been on his papal writings.73  Most treatments 
of Love and Responsibility can be found within works which take as their subject either 
his thought in general, for example Rocco Buttiglione’s Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of 
the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, or his whole life, for example George 
Weigel’s Witness to Hope.  Treatment may be chapter-long at most.  None directly 
investigates the question of how he understands love to be related to sexuality. 
The present investigation will be divided into four chapters.  In the first we will 
examine the pastoral and academic background of Love and Responsibility so that 
through knowledge of its sources its teaching on love and sexuality can be more fully 
understood.  The second chapter will take up the text of the work and concentrate on the 
“personalistic norm”, the obvious centerpiece of the work’s ethical analysis and the 
element which most indicates that sexuality has something to do with love.  The third 
chapter will focus on love itself, on what Wojtyła understands to be its essence and on 
the forms it may take and the elements which may be incorporated into it.  In the fourth 
and final chapter we will take the conclusions about Wojtyła’s understanding of love 
and examine his understanding of human sexuality in their light.
                                                                                                                                          
study will rely on the one English translation done by H. T. Willetts (Karol Wojtyła, Love and 
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Chapter One: Pastoral and Academic Background 
 
Love and Responsibility is the work of a spiritual advisor.  If it seems to be that 
of a philosopher—since “[t]he book is, by and large, of a philosophical character”74—
this is because a spiritual advisor’s “task is not only to command or forbid but to justify, 
to interpret, to explain”75, and philosophy is the tool by which the latter ends must be 
sought.  Of this twofold task, it is the second part with which this work is principally 
concerned.  As important as commanding or forbidding are, they do not particularly 
interest Wojtyła here.  His intended reader is the Catholic who already knows the 
Church’s teachings on sexual morality and holds them to be true.76  Drawing up a set of 
rules for Catholics is fairly easy77; it is explaining them in a way graspable by natural 
reason that requires the real effort from the spiritual advisor.  This is what this work was 
written for.  Its successes and failures, as well as its innovativeness and originality, will 
lie not so much in the conclusions, but rather in the arguments which are given to 
support them.  These arguments, which are meant to justify, interpret and explain 
Catholic doctrine, are the result of philosophical reflection on experience.  For Wojtyła, 
a celibate priest, this experience is not of the direct personal sort.  His experience, he 
says, “is certainly less immediate” than that of the person living a conjugal life, but it is 
“at the same time very much wider” since in the diversity of his pastoral work he has 
encountered 
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“particular problems so often, and in such a variety of circumstances and situations”.78  
Love and Responsibility is, we may say, the product of the coming together of 
experience and a philosophically trained mind, all for the pastoral purpose of putting 
“the norms of Catholic sexual morality on a firm basis, a basis as definitive as possible, 
relying on the most elementary and incontrovertible moral truths and the most 
fundamental values or goods.”79 
This chapter examines the biographical background relevant to the creation of 
Love and Responsibility.  As indicated above, this background is to be largely found in 
two areas: pastoral experience and philosophic influences.  Wojtyła’s understanding of 
the relationship between love and human sexuality is the specific object of investigation 
for this thesis, and so we will attempt, as best we can, to discover the source of this 
understanding within the work’s more general background. 
The pastoral experience relevant to Love and Responsibility began twelve years 
before the book’s publication.  Wojtyła’s first pastoral assignment came in the latter half 
of 1948.  While he had already been a priest for two years, he had spent these two years 
working on a dissertation in Rome.  After a brief but significant stop in France, he 
returned to Poland and was assigned by Cardinal Adam Stefan Sapieha, the Archbishop 
of Krakow, to Niegowic, a village fifteen kilometers east of the city.  Holding himself to 
a promise made in Ars, France, he sought to make himself a “prisoner of the 
confessional”, just as the famous Curé of Ars, Jean Vianney, had.80  It may be assumed 
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that much of Wojtyła’s second-hand experience of the problems of sexual morality 
occurred during his time in the confessional. 
In addition to Niegowic’s being the beginning of his career as a confessor, it was 
also here that he “took his first steps in ministry to engaged couples and newlyweds.”81  
This ministry would be greatly expanded in his next pastoral assignment.  In 1950, 
Cardinal Sapieha, seeking to secure the Church’s future in the face of communist 
pressure, decided to expand the ministry to the students at the Jagiellonian University.82  
Wojtyła was numbered among the priests who would be used for this end.  He was 
assigned to St. Florian’s, a parish near the university, and he became a student chaplain.  
In that same year he began Krakow’s first ever marriage-preparation program.83  At the 
time such a program was a rarity.  Wojtyła intended it to be a systematic preparation for 
young couples for Christian marriage and family life.  This end was sought through 
“religious reflection, theological education, and a frank exploration of the practical and 
personal difficulties and opportunities of married life and child-rearing.”84  The next 
year he expanded the program, inviting doctors, nurses and lay associates to help him.  
While he remained at St. Florian’s for a total of only 28 months, he managed to bless 
160 marriages, an average of more than one a week.85 
It was also during his short stay at St. Florian’s that Srodowisko began to be 
formed.  Srodowisko was the term that Wojtyła later used to refer to the “environment” 
or “milieu” (two literal renderings of the word Srodowisko) which was created by the 
“fusing together of several networks of young adults and young married couples” with 
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whom he worked.86  The crucial influence that this network of friendships had on 
Wojtyła’s ideas and ministry is, according to George Weigel, “indisputable.”87  Wojtyła 
“thought of his chaplaincy as a ministry of accompaniment”88 and this accompaniment 
often took the form of trips, usually for skiing, hiking or canoeing.89  These trips were 
occasions for extended spiritual direction, and for almost all of his young friends the 
most important transition in life was marriage.  It was from Srodowisko that Wojtyła’s 
‘second-hand’ experience of marriage was most significantly derived.  As a spiritual 
advisor wrestling with the “need to validate [the] rules”90, the majority of his extended 
encounters with young couples occurred here, both in and out of the confessional.  The 
‘second-hand’ experience of marriage which he gained produced in 1960, not only Love 
and Responsibilty, but also The Jeweler’s Shop, a play published in the journal Znak and 
subtitled A Meditation on the Sacrament of Marriage, Passing on Occasion into a 
Drama.  Several members of Srodowisko recognized themselves in it, both in terms of 
personality traits and events that had happened to them.91 
The academic training relevant to the creation of Love and Responsibility had 
begun a little earlier than did the pastoral experience.  In 1942 Wojtyła entered 
Krakow’s underground seminary.  At the time he had already spent several years at the 
Jagiellonian University since the fall of 1938, but had been primarily a student of 
literature and drama.92  His first serious encounter with philosophy occurred only after 
his entrance into the seminary.  He was assigned to read Kazimierz Wais’s Metaphysics, 
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a work which was “written in the dry, dense, highly abstract formulas of early twentieth-
century neo-scholasticism.”93  Accustomed to literary reading, he found this a very 
difficult work.  According to Wojtyła, the effort was well repaid: “What intuition and 
sensibility had until then taught me about the world found solid confirmation.”94  Weigel 
interprets this “solid confirmation” as an inoculation “against the infection of radical 
skepticism”.95  In addition to this introduction to the realist philosophy of the Thomistic 
tradition, one may suspect that it was during his seminary years that he was first given a 
detailed exposition of the Church’s doctrinal teachings on marriage and sexuality. 
Cardinal Sapieha accelerated the process of ordination so that his seminarian 
would be able to begin his doctoral studies at Rome’s Pontifical Athenaeum of St. 
Thomas Aquinas, the “Angelicum”.96  Wojtyła was ordained on the first of November, 
1946, and left for Rome two weeks later.  There, under the direction of Father Garrigou-
Lagrange, he worked on his doctoral thesis which was entitled The Doctrine of Faith 
According to St. John of the Cross.  Father Wojtyła’s time in Rome was relevant to the 
creation of Love and Responsibility in two ways.  The first concerns the Angelicum in 
general and Father Garrigou-Lagrange in particular.  While at the time there were many 
Catholic intellectual circles interested in placing Thomas’ thought in dialogue with 
certain modern philosophies, such an interest was not to be found at the Angelicum.  It 
had become the stronghold of the traditional neo-scholasticism of the 19th century.97  
                                                
93 Ibid. 70 
94 Frossard and John Paul II, “Be Not Afraid!” 17, as quoted by Weigel 70 
95 Weigel 70 
96 Ibid. 79 
97 Ibid. 84  While it may sound awkward to speak of “traditional neo-scholasticism”, the qualifier 
“traditional” is meant to distinguish the neo-scholasticism of the 19th century, which was carried over and 
maintained by the Angelicum, from the “neo-scholasticism” of certain individuals who were open to 
incorporating certain elements of modern philosophy into the general framework of Aquinas’s 
philosophy.  For the purposes of this paper the term Neo-Scholasticism is interchangeable with Neo-
  23
The “undisputed master of traditional neo-scholasticism” and the “leading figure on the 
Angelicum faculty” was Garrigou-Lagrange.98  He would soon become fiercely engaged 
in a theological controversy over some of the exploratory currents of contemporary 
theology.99  With Garrigou-Lagrange as his director and the Angelicum as his 
intellectual milieu, Wojtyła was well educated in traditional Thomism.  This does not 
mean, however, that the Thomism at work in his later thought was to be of this type.  By 
the time he came to write Love and Responsibiltiy, his Thomism had been substantially 
shaped by a sustained encounter with the thought of Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler.  
The value of the Angelicum’s traditional education was, as Angelicum graduate 
Archbishop Jorge Mejía suggests, that it grounded one in the tradition and made one 
more careful when exploring creative approaches to Thomism.100  Because of the 
Anglicum, Wojtyła knew the tradition in which he was to make innovations. 
The second way concerns the doctoral thesis itself.  Despite Garrigou-
Lagrange’s disagreement, Wojtyła choose to completely avoid the phrase, “divine 
object” when speaking of knowing God.  This was to emphasize the fact that God could 
not be known in the way that an object is known, but only in the way that a person is 
known, through mutual self-giving.101  Presumably the concept of mutual self-giving, 
which is so essential to Love and Responsibility, developed significantly during the time 
that Wojtyła worked on his thesis.  According to Buttiglione, this aspect of the thesis is 
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also to be connected with the development of the personalistic norm.102  A person is 
“nonobjectivizable” both for the intellect and for the actions of another.  A person must 
always be treated as a person, never as an object.103 
Upon the completion of his doctoral dissertation, Wojtyła returned home to 
Poland, probably with little expectation or desire for an academic career.  The next few 
years were spent doing pastoral work, but when Sapieha died and was succeeded by 
Egeniusz Baziak in 1951, Wojtyła was urged by the new archbishop to return to 
academic life and work on a second doctoral degree by writing a habilitation thesis, the 
requirement for teaching at the university level.  Wojtyła disagreed with the idea, but 
Baziak insisted.104  Father Rózyck, a former mentor, suggested that he look at the work 
of Max Scheler.105  Wojtyła agreed and took up the question of whether Scheler’s 
phenomenology of ethics was a suitable basis on which to found a true Christian ethics.  
Ultimately, the answer was that it was not. 
Scheler’s system was primarily concerned with values.  Values belong to the 
objective world, but the person is the only subject in which they are experienced.  
Values also exist in a hierarchy.  Morality is essentially an emotional experience that 
follows upon the pursuit and obtainment of values.  Experience of moral goodness or 
moral badness depends on the place which the value occupies in the hierarchy.  In this 
pursuit reason plays a subordinate role.  It is not the judge of something’s value; that 
                                                
102 Buttiglione 53 
103 Wojtyła, admittedly, uses the word object in two different ways.  Object may be used to refer to 
anything which is not a personal being.  Object and person are here opposite terms.  This is the sense of 
the word object in accordance with which a person can never be treated as an object.  But at other times a 
person is said to be an object.  In such cases the term object is paired up as the opposite of the term 
subject.  A person is a subject, but all subjects are also objects.  To be an object in this sense is to exist in 
an objective way, to be part of a world composed of many entities which may interact with each other. 
104 Weigel 124-125 
105 Ibid. 
  25
cognitive task is performed by emotion.  Reason serves only to discover the means by 
which the value might be obtained. 
Wojtyła frequently described Scheler’s philosophy of ethics as being 
“emotionalist” and rejected it for two reasons.  First, he disagreed with the subordinate 
role that Scheler assigned to reason.  Reason, Wojtyła believed, is capable of 
determining not only the means, but also the end of one’s action.  Second, he thought 
that Scheler, for all his usual phenomenological astuteness, had overlooked the 
phenomenological fact that in the use of the will, the will is experienced as the efficient 
cause of action.  By focusing so strongly on emotions as a motivation on the will, 
Scheler made the will appear as something purely passive.106 
But Wojtyła’s encounter with Scheler was not a completely negative one.  In the 
creation of Love and Responsibility Wojtyła was crucially influenced by Scheler in two 
ways.  First, there was the central role given to the concept of value.  Love and 
Responsibility presents the problems of sexual morality as questions about the proper 
response to “the value of the person”, about how one is to integrate one’s reactions to 
“the value of the body and sex”, and “the value of masculinity/femininity”, into the 
more fundamental “value of the person”.  Emotion plays an important role in this.  It 
does not perceive value but rather reacts to it and makes a person’s subjective 
experience of a value more vivid.  To some extent it is intuitive.  The vividness of a 
reaction does not completely depend on the clarity of cognition; in many cases emotion 
becomes a motivation for further cognitive examination.  But emotion, being essentially 
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a reaction to perceived value, is also liable to deception as to the actual nature of the 
thing to which it is reacting.  Only reason may perceive the truth about an object and be 
the judge of its value.  Emotion must be made to accord with reason’s judgment.  Such a 
proper response to value is a certain perfection of human nature.  More important for 
morality, however, is the response given to value in terms of one’s actions, since 
actions, unlike emotions, are under the direct control of the will.107 
Second, there was the “phenomenological method”.  This phrase, which refers to 
the method of investigation employed by phenomenology, became especially fitting for 
Wojtyła.  For him phenomenology was a method, not an end; he was not a 
phenomenologist in the way that Scheler or Edmund Husserl were, but his 
understanding did share some things in common with theirs.  Phenomenology was the 
study of the experiential, of anything which may be experienced.  It was concerned with 
experience as a whole and did not discriminate between the sensory and the non-sensory 
as did empiricism.108  Its aim was to describe, as well as possible, the experience of a 
given object.  This much Wojtyła had in common with Scheler and his teacher Husserl.  
But unlike them, he always understood phenomenology as the preparation for 
metaphysics.  While phenomenology was concerned with experiential phenomena, 
metaphysics was concerned with reality itself, experiential or not.  The human soul, for 
example, would be an object of metaphysics, but not of phenomenology since it is not 
the object of direct experience.  We may have experiential knowledge of those things 
which are referred to by the words “will” and “intellect”, but of the human soul, which 
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according Thomism underlies them, no such knowledge is possible.  The aim of 
metaphysics is to describe reality as it is in itself, not as it is experienced.  But the way 
that metaphysical knowledge is gained is through a process of abstraction from 
experience; it is, we may say, through our experiential knowledge of the will and 
intellect, that we arrive at the concept of the human soul which we conclude must 
underlie them.  Phenomenology, the study of the experiential, is thus the road that leads 
to metaphysics.  This is how Wojtyła came to understand the role of phenomenology in 
philosophy. 
Love and Responsibility was the first work in which Wojtyła employed it as a 
method.109  It was not to be the last.  The Acting Person, which was published almost a 
decade later, is considered to be the climax of his philosophic career and the work in 
which the phenomenological method and its relation to Thomistic metaphysics is most 
prominent.  While much may be justly made of the method’s use in The Acting Person, 
for Love and Responsibility, there is, I believe, a danger of presenting the method’s use 
as the most important aspect of the work.  The work’s primary value then appears to lie 
in its role as a stepping stone on the way to The Acting Person.  It is, however, 
extremely doubtful that Wojtyła’s primary motivation for writing Love and 
Responsibility was to test out the method.  Some writers have given this impression, or 
at least have not guarded sufficiently against it.  But in the light of Wojtyła’s consistent 
pastoral attention to marriage and sexuality, it is unthinkable that for him the subject 
matter was of secondary importance to the method.  As the introduction to the work 
makes clear, the aim of the author is pastoral and he is writing in his function as a 
spiritual director.  It is worth pointing out that the phenomenological method accords 
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wonderfully well with the author’s indicated aim and function.  He desires to enable his 
reader to “validate” 110 for his or herself the truth of the Church’s teaching on sexuality.  
The phenomenological method, which is the conscious reflection on experience, is 
particularly suited for this task, since for it allows the reader to judge from his or her 
own experience the validity or invalidity of the author’s arguments. 
The Scheler study also brought Wojtyła into serious contact with the thought of 
Immanuel Kant.  The significance of Kant’s ethical writings for the history of ethics was 
immense.111  In the later decades of the 19th century a widespread reaction against his 
thought rose up in philosophy, a reaction which could be especially located in the 
schools of Neo-Thomism, Marxism and Phenomenology.112  Scheler himself had 
developed his ethics in conscious and vigorous opposition to Kant.113  This opposition 
was, we may assume, what brought Wojtyła into contact with Kant; he needed to 
understand him in order to understand Scheler.  While Scheler was inevitably more 
important for the dissertation itself, Kant was roughly of equal importance for the 
development of Wojtyła’s thought as a whole.  The more Wojtyła studied the two 
philosophers, the more they came to exist as a pair in his mind.  In the series of essays 
Wojtyła published in the years leading up to Love and Responsibility, Kant and Scheler 
frequently appear side by side and are understood as extreme opposites which 
nevertheless share a common error, the failure to treat the will as the efficient cause of 
                                                
110 Love and Responsibility 16 
111 This was at least the way that Wojtyła saw it.  See Karol Wojtyła, “The Seperation of Experience from 
the Act in Ethics” in Person and Community: Selected Eassays trans. by Thereas Sandok (New York: 
Peter Lang, 1993) 32. 
112 Ibid. 
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an action.114  When the time came to write the work, Kant’s thought was to be a 
fundamental influence. 
Wojtyła found Kant’s philosophy of ethics to be, like that of Scheler, ultimately 
unsatisfactory, but not without value.  In Curriculum Philosophicum, John Paul II 
relates that the time he spent struggling with Kant’s second categorical imperative (“act 
always in such a way that the other person is the end and not merely the instrument of 
your action”115) was “particularly important” for his later ethical thought.116  Of all his 
works, Love and Responsibility is probably the most indebted to this aspect of Kant’s 
thought, and in the next chapter the imperative’s relation to Wojtyła’s “personalistic 
norm” will be examined in more detail.  Also associated with the struggle with the 
second categorical imperative are two other positive influences which Kant exerted on 
Wojtyła.  First, Wojtyła followed Kant in relentlessly opposing utilitarianism in ethics.  
While Wojtyła almost certainly would have been an opponent of it even had he not 
studied Kant, Kant influenced the way he attacked it.117  Second, while not necessarily 
adopting Kant’s conclusions, Wojtyła followed him in making his approach to ethics 
“normative”, an approach which was intent on “explaining and justifying morality on 
the basis of values and norms” rather than on “explaining it on the basis of the ultimate 
                                                
114 See Person and Community especially those articles in “Part One: Ethical and Moral Considerations” 
115 This is the form of the second categorical imperative which Wojtyla attributes to Kant.  Love and 
Responsibility 27-28.  
116 Curriculum Philosophicum 3.  Weigel quotes from this work on page 128 of Witness to Hope.  I was 
unable to locate the text itself. 
117 Buttiglione says that Wojtyła’s “criticisms of utilitarianism are entirely drawn from the parallel 
Kantian critique.”  While I certainly am willing to believe Buttiglione that Kant’s critique influenced 
Wojtyła, I am hesitant to believe that the criticisms are entirely drawn from it.  Wojtyła’s primary 
criticism of marital utilitarianism is that pleasure is not an objective good and so cannot serves as a basis 
for the unification of persons which is love; this does not seem like a typically Kantian form of thought. 
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end”.118  If in following Kant on this point Wojtyła saw himself as departing in some 
way from Aquinas119, this could only be in terms of emphasis and perspective; Wojtyła 
always remained fundamentally in accord with Aquinas.  Nevertheless, I believe that  
Wojtyła’s adoption of a normative emphasis was probably one of the factors that led his 
treatment of sexuality to be so different from Aquinas’.120   
Bearing in mind the influence of Scheler’s emphasis on values and subjective 
experience and Kant’s second categorical imperative and normative approach to ethics, 
we may better discern Thomas Aquinas’ effect on Love and Responsibility.  When 
Wojtyła returned to academic life and began his study of Scheler, he “came to see that 
the philosophical analysis of reality and its relationship to the moral life he had been 
taught at the seminary and the Angelicum was inadequate in the contemporary world.121  
But this did not mean that he abandoned Thomism.  Each of his meetings with modern 
philosophy was followed by a return to Thomas and, according to Buttiglione, “[this] 
return, upon which he meditated critically, was the means by which Wojtyła created an 
original philosophical construction.”122 
                                                
118 Wojtyla, “Ethics and Moral Theology” in Person and Community 103.  I call Wojtyla’s approach to 
ethics “normative” only in the sense of “explaining and justifying morality on the basis of values and 
norms”.  I do not have in mind any other meaning which the term might have acquired in the history of 
philosophy. 
119 In his article “Ethics and Moral Theology” Wojtyla says that the “admiration we have for this 
“summa,” [here meaning the writing of Thomas Aquinas] however, does not have to mean—and even 
should not mean—that we regard it as a work complete and perfect in every respect” and then goes on to 
list we he judges to be positive developments in philosophy since Aquinas; one of these is the 
“normative” approach to ethics. 
120 Aquinas’ treatment of chastity, virginity and lust in the Summa Theologiae is to be found the Second 
Part of the Second Part, Question 151-154.  Treatment of marriage occurs in the Supplement, Questions 
41-68, which was compiled from existing material after Aquinas death, probably by Brother Rainaldo da 
Piperno.  Treatment of sexual matters can also be found in Summa Contra Gentiles Book III, 122-126.  I 
suspect that Wojtyla’s adoption of a “normative” emphasis helped him move his treatment of sexual 
intercourse away from being one in which intercourse is viewed primarily as a means to further ends. 
121 Weigel 126 
122 Buttiglione 44 
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A brief examination of the key terms employed by Love and Responsibility 
reveals the prevalence of Thomistic thought.  The terms person, body, soul, spirit, 
object, subject, will, intellect, virtue, and love are all used in accord with the way 
Thomas uses them.123  Wojtyła, however, does not, except on one minor occasion with 
the term continence, call upon Thomism to give content to these words.  Rather, he 
expects his reader to attribute to these terms the content derivable from the experience of 
those realities to which these words refer, given the reader’s long general familiarity 
with those words.   From this basis he then builds their content further through reflection 
on experience.  No initial assent is required on the metaphysical level, and yet the 
concepts move towards metaphysics and are never at variance with the form they take in 
Thomistic thought.  This approach is, I believe, the “phenomenological method”. 
The encounter with Scheler and Kant, and the re-encounter with Aquinas began 
with the habilitation thesis but were sustained through the years which followed and led 
up to the publication of Love and Responsibility.  Wojtyła received his degree from the 
Jagiellonian University in 1954, but before he was able to join the Faculty of Theology, 
the university was closed down by the communist government.124  He was soon hired by 
the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin.  There he joined several 
other philosophers who had a common vision about the mission of philosophy in 
Poland.  Together they embarked on a project that was to be of historical significance.  
Its influence on Love and Responsibility, however, seems to be limited.  More important 
for the work’s creation were the classes which Wojtyła taught as the occupant of the 
                                                
123 I believe it is better to label these terms Thomistic rather than Scholastic.  While Thomas is to be 
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Chair of Ethics.  The 1954-55 upper-year lecture series was entitled “Act and Moral 
Experience” and was an encounter in which the philosophies of Scheler, Kant and 
Aquinas/Aristotle met and contended.125  The next year’s was entitled “Goodness and 
Value” and considered the above mentioned philosophers with the addition of Plato and 
Augustine.  “Norm and Happiness” followed in the 1956-57 academic year and involved 
a confrontation with the ethics of Jeremy Bentham and David Hume.  “Love and 
Responsibility” was the title for the lecture series of 1957-58 and was continued for a 
second year.126 
Throughout his years as the Chairman for Ethics, Wojtyła also published 
numerous journal articles.  Many of these reflected his ongoing encounter with Scheler, 
Kant and Aquinas as well his continued interest in sexual ethics.  In 1957 Wojtyła went 
on a vacation with students of medicine, philosophy and psychology.  Together they 
discussed a draft of his book which was to bear the same name as that year’s lecture 
series.127  In 1960, Love and Responsibility was finally published.  The author’s 
academic life progressively slowed down afterwards as his administrative 
responsibilities as Bishop of Krakow and later as Archbishop grew.  He did, however, 
continue to hold his position at the university during this time.  He retired from the 
Faculty of Philosophy only in 1978 when he was elected pope. 
In summary, Love and Responsibility is best understood as the product of 
Wojtyła’s pastoral experience and his philosophic training.  His pastoral experience was 
derived from three main sources, which frequently overlapped: the confessional, 
marriage preparation programs, and the interpersonal network of Srodowisko.  His 
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philosophic training began in the seminary, but was quickened during the Scheler study.  
By the time he came to write Love and Responsibility his philosophic approach was one 
in which the ethics was “normative”, metaphysics was Thomistic, and the method was 
phenomenological. 
Our examination of biographical influences has followed the indications given 
by the Wojtyła in his introduction.  There may, and probably are, other influences.  It 
would be unlikely that someone such as Dietrich von Hildebrand, who was a devout 
Catholic, a phenomenologist, a personal friend of Max Scheler, a critic of Scheler’s 
philosophy, and one of the most significant 20th century contributors to the Church’s 
theological and philosophical understanding of marriage and sexuality, had no influence 
on Wojtyła.  Another possible influence is Augustine.  Wojtyła makes much of the 
concepts of use and enjoyment128, and for anyone acquainted with Augustine, this 
immediately calls to mind Augustine’s treatment of uti [to use] and frui [to enjoy].  At 
one point Wojtyła mentions Augustine as the originator of these two opposed attitudes 
of use and enjoyment.  But the strange thing is that Augustine, who notoriously gave the 
appearance of claiming that we should use others, is presented as if his thought were in 
accord with Wojtyła’s, where there is uncompromising condemnation of using persons.  
But Augustine’s position is in fact more subtle than it is usually presented as being.129  
The conclusion would seem to be that Wojtyła either read Augustine very little, and so 
had no knowledge of the claim that persons are to be used, or read him in depth, and so 
had a different interpretation than that which is commonly given. 
                                                
128 H. T. Willetts’ English translation seems to be somewhat misleading at this point.  The Polish word 
“uzjwac” can be translated, according to Buttiglione (Karol Wojtyła: The Thought of the Man Who 
Became John Paul II 83ff), as both “to use” and “to enjoy”.  While present to some degree, the pairing of 
use and enjoyment is not as pronounced in the original text as it is in the English. 
129 Especially see Augustine’s De Doctrina Christiana 1:36-37. 
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Chapter Two: Love and the Personalistic Norm 
 
 When it was said earlier that Wojtyła chose to take a “normative” approach to 
ethics, this meant that instead of making morality a question of how actions relate as 
means to an ultimate end, he made it a question of how they conform with moral 
principles.  The principle with which Love and Responsibility particularly concerns itself 
is the “personalistic norm”.  The fullest form given to it by Wojtyła is as follows: 
whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not 
treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must 
allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct 
personal ends.130 
 
This form occurs only once; usually the norm is expressed as “persons are not to be 
used” or some variant of this.  The role that the norm plays in Love and Responsibility is 
hard to miss.  It is without a doubt the centerpiece of the work’s treatment of sexual 
morality. 
 Wojtyła dedicates the very first section of the book to a presentation of it.  This 
presentation begins with an outline of personal nature.  There is, observes Wojtyła, a felt 
resistance to the idea that another human being can be understood simply as an 
individual member of the human species.  This resistance, which is not experienced 
when one considers an object of another sort (eg. a dog, rock or car), is 
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rooted in the recognition that there is “a particular richness and perfection” 131 in the way 
that a human being exists.  The term person was coined to signify this.132 
The source of the person’s existential richness and perfection seems to be twofold.  
First, there is the human ability commonly referred to as reason.  Although animals 
possess varying degrees of cognitive abilities, in none of them does cognition take on 
the “spiritual” character which it does in human beings.  Human cognition is, 
presumably133, “spiritual” because it is orientated towards something non-material, truth.   
This in no way means that the human person is disconnected from the world.  Rather, a 
person is involved in the world more intimately than anything else is.  Because of 
cognition’s orientation towards truth, a human person is able to relate not only to the 
“outer” appearance of an object, but also the “inner” truth, or essence, of that object.134 
Second, with respect to the twofold source, is that ability which we refer to as free 
will.  Human desire, like human cognition, may be observed as something “spiritual” 
since it is particularly related to the concept of goodness.  That we are able to act from 
free choice, as opposed to instinct, is, Wojtyła believes, verifiable from experience.  
Another important experience is that one person cannot will for another, a person can 
only will for him or herself.  This experiential fact is the reason why traditional 
Christian philosophy assigned to the person the characteristic of being alteri 
incommunicabilis, incapable of being transferred to another.  From these two 
experiential facts, that a person may act from free choice and that willing is an action 
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which no-one else can do for a person, it follows that a person is self-determinative, 
though not in an absolute sense, and that a person is self-possessive, sui juris as 
traditional Christian philosophy has it.  Not only can a person govern him or herself, 
provided normal development has taken place, but he or she must govern him or herself, 
since no one else is genuinely able to do this.135 
 Such is Love and Responsibility’s outline of personal nature.  Wojtyła 
immediately follows it with an analysis of the verb ‘to use’.  This analysis is extremely 
short.  First, a definition is given: “To use means to employ some object of action as a 
means to an end”.136  Then it is pointed out that when an object is employed as a means, 
it is subordinated to the end and also “to some extent to the agent”, since the agent 
chooses the end.137  Human beings make use of a variety of objects in order to achieve a 
chosen end.  Sometimes the object may be a material entity, like rock or metal, or 
perhaps a tool crafted from such material, like a hammer, or even an animal, like a cow 
which one can milk.  In the case of the first two types (material entities and tools), 
Wojtyła sees no moral problem in their being objects of use.  In fact, use is the attitude 
which a human being should have towards them.138  In the case of animals, use is also 
held to be the proper attitude, although Wojtyła notes that “since they are beings 
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137 Ibid. 
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of a material object does not degrade that object, but rather is a great honor to it since, although by nature 
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endowed with feeling and sensitive to pain, man is required to ensure that the use of 
these creatures is never attended by suffering or physical torture.”139 
 A human being can also make another human being an object of use.  However, 
unlike the previously mentioned objects, a human being is a person and a person by 
nature is able to determine his or her own aims and choose the appropriate means to 
achieve them.  When a person is used, the capacity and responsibility for self-
determination is denied.  “Anyone,” declares Wojtyła, “who treats a person as the means 
to an end does violence to the very essence of the other, to what constitutes its natural 
right.”140  The truth of this statement—this statement being one variant of the 
personalistic norm—is believed by Wojtyła to be self-evident to the mind once it has 
understood the basic terms involved and he expects his reader hold the truth of this 
statement as a given.  Nevertheless, he also wants, and needs, his reader to gain a deeper 
understanding of it, for as we shall see later, a deepened, expanded understanding of the 
norm is necessary for the success of the work as a whole.  This is why, rather than 
simply stating the norm immediately, he first examines personal nature and the form of 
action referred to as “using”.  The purpose of “Analysis of the Verb ‘To Use’” is not to 
convince the reader but to make sense of the reader’s conviction and deepen his or her 
understanding of it. 
After the examinations of personal nature and of use described above, Wojtyła 
develops his understanding of the personalistic norm in two crucial ways.  The first 
concerns the discernment of what the opposite of use might be.  When the question “Is it 
permissible to regard a person as a means to an end and to use a person in that 
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capacity?”141 is first asked, Wojtyła draws attention to three problematic relationships: 
employer and worker, military officer and army ranker, and parent and child.142  It 
would seem that in each case the former directs the latter to ends which the former has 
chosen and perhaps alone knows.  Use, of the sort with which the personalistic norm is 
concerned, may undoubtedly occur in each case, but Wojtyła does not believe it is 
inevitable.  In the officer-ranker relationship the use which the officer makes of the 
ranker ceases to be a dehumanizing and immoral use when both parties make the 
defense of the country the conscious end of their actions.  By doing so, both subordinate 
themselves to that end and a fundamental equality begins to exist between them.  The 
subordination that would otherwise have been an instance of use in Wojtyła’s (bad) 
sense is now not; it is something willed by two ultimately equally parties as a means to 
the end which they both desire.  A common aim, or common good, also seems to 
provide the answer in the case of the employer-worker relationship, although Wojtyła is 
not as clear here as he is with the previous relationship.  He says only that if “the 
employer and employee so arrange their association that the common good which both 
serve becomes clearly visible, then the danger of treating a person as someone less than 
he really is will be reduced almost to nothing.”143  One may assume that he considers the 
problem of just organization of labour to be one with many practical complexities and 
therefore the best that can be done here is to point out one of the essential elements of a 
solution to the problem. 
When one person uses another, he or she relates to that other in a way that rejects 
the other’s ability for self-determination.  The presence of a common good, a good 
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chosen and accepted by both, excludes such an attitude.  It also does something else; it 
creates a “special bond” which “unites the persons involved internally”.144  Here we 
should recall something which Wojtyła said earlier: “Inner life means spiritual life.  It 
revolves around truth and goodness.”145  Persons are united “internally” because they 
see themselves as sharing the same attitude towards the truth and goodness of whatever 
their common good is.  It is this effect which, Wojtyła claims, allows one “to catch a 
preliminary glimpse of… the only clear alternative to using a person as a means to an 
end”.146  This alternative is none other than love, for love, as Wojtyła reveals later in the 
section, is the unification of persons.147  Since love is the opposite of use, the 
personalistic norm is able to be given a positive form such as “A person is an entity of a 
sort to which the only proper and adequate way to relate is love.”148 
The other way in which this opening section attempts to expand the reader’s 
understanding of the personalistic norm concerns “the second meaning of the verb ‘to 
use’”.  Wojtyła points out that “[o]ur thinking and our acts of will… are accompanied by 
various emotional overtones or states”149 and that “the emotional-affective overtones or 
states which are so important a part of man’s entire inner life have as a rule either a 
positive or a negative charge”.150  The terms pleasure and pain are used to refer to these 
charges respectively.  In Polish the word uzjwac can mean not only “to use” but also “to 
experience pleasure”.151  Because of “the particular richness, variety, and intensity of 
those emotional-affective experiences and states which occur when the object of activity 
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is a person of the opposite sex”, Wojtyła sees this association between using and 
experiencing pleasure as especially enlightening for sexual morality.  For human 
persons there exists the possibility, due to the power of reason, of isolating pleasure and 
making it the distinct end of one’s activity.152  “If actions involving a person of the 
opposite sex,” says Wojtyła, “are shaped exclusively or primarily with this in view, then 
that person will become only the means to an end—and ‘use in its second meaning 
(=enjoy) represents, as we see, a particular variant of ‘use’ in its first meaning.”153 
One uses another whenever one disregards the other’s self-determining ability 
and employs the other as means to an end which one has oneself alone appointed.  
Pleasure is able to be designated as an end and so there obviously exists the possibility 
of using a person for pleasure.  But this is not what Wojtyła has in mind when he 
connects the pursuit of pleasure with using; it is simply taken for granted.  The 
association he draws here between the two meanings of uzjwac has to do rather with the 
nature of pleasure itself.  “Pleasure,” he says, “is, of its nature, a good for the moment 
and only for a particular subject, it is not a super-subjective or trans-subjective good.”154  
The solution to the problem of use proposed earlier was the adoption of a common aim, 
or common good, but here such a solution is not possible because pleasure, being a 
subjective experience, cannot be a common good, one which is sharable because it is 
objective.  In the case of a couple who make “mutual pleasure” their goal, the “special 
bond” which is the beginning of love is not brought about.  Mutual pleasure fails to 
unite the two persons “internally” because it is not actually one good, but the artificial 
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combination of two separate subjective goods.  Since love and use are mutual opposites, 
such a relationship must be one of “mutual use”. 
This line of thought forms the basis for Wojtyła’s criticism of utilitarianism.  
Since pleasure is a “purely subjective good”155, the utilitarian imperative to seek the 
maximum amount of pleasure for the maximum amount of people can have no other 
motivational force on a person beyond being a generally efficient way to obtain the most 
amount of pleasure for oneself provided others practice it as well.  Because of the nature 
of the good which motivates a person’s activity in such a case egoism is unavoidable 
and love can never be anything more than “the harmonization of egoisms”.156 
It is in the context of this criticism of utilitarianism that the previously 
mentioned statement, “Love is the unification of persons”157, is made.  This is the most 
important statement about love in the entire work.  The unification of persons is not an 
aspect of love, it is the essence of it and all that is said about love throughout the whole 
of Love and Responsibility should be understood with this in mind.  The reason for 
identifying this as the essence of love is twofold.  First, there is no other statement about 
love made in the work that would seem to be an expression of love’s essence.158  
Second, by taking this as the essence, it is possible to understand why Wojtyła 
seemingly has no problem in identifying attraction, desire, goodwill, friendship and 
betrothed love as all being genuine forms of love, even though some of them—goodwill 
and love-as-desire especially—are opposites in a certain respect. 
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 “Analysis of the Verb ‘To Use’” asks what the proper attitude is which one must 
take towards another person when that person is the object of one’s activity; it answers 
that love is the proper attitude and use its opposite.  The proper/improper relationship 
ascribed to love and use signifies that the two are opposites in the sense that one is the 
ontological privation of the other.159  While Love and Responsibility initially seeks to 
shed light on love through an analysis of its opposite, this approach can only go so far; 
strictly speaking it is only through knowing love that one can know use.  Because of the 
being/non-being relationship between love and use, a positive definition for use can only 
ever be a partial one.  Use, as it appears in Love and Responsibility as the opposite of 
love, signifies more than the mere employment of another person as an ignorant means 
to an end which one has appointed.  Such a definition is contradicted by the claim that a 
relationship based on a common pursuit of pleasure is still one of use.  It is also 
contradicted by the brief treatment of the parent-child relationship.  “Do not parents,” 
asks Wojtyła, “who alone know the ends for which they are rearing their children, 
regard them in a sense as a means to ends of their own, since the children themselves do 
not understand those ends, nor do they consciously aim at them?”160  While the 
possibility and danger of use in this relationship is recognized,161 no universal 
condemnation of parenting is given and one must assume the obvious, that Wojtyła 
believes that parenting is not intrinsically immoral, that while a parent may direct a child 
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and Aquinas, understands evil as a privation of the good.  But there is another way in which privation can 
be understood.  Male and female are opposite and each implies the privation of the other.  In such a case 
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to an end which the child is ignorant of, there is a way this may be a form of love rather 
than use.  A little reflection will reveal that the parent-child relationship differs from the 
officer-ranker and employer-worker relationships in that the child, as opposed to the 
ranker and worker, lacks the personal development needed for proper self-
determination.  When one directs a soldier or worker towards a good end but does so 
against his or her will, one “does violence to the very essence of the other, to what 
constitutes [his or her] natural right”,162 specifically because the other’s ability for self-
determination is being denied and rejected.  The same cannot be said of the direction of 
a child since self-determination has yet to be fully developed and one cannot deny or 
reject what is not yet present.  True education, I believe Wojtyła would say, does not 
deny the truth about the other’s ability for self-determination, but rather, by seeking to 
foster its development, affirms it. 
Use is the opposite of love and love is the unification of persons.  Relating to a 
person in a way in which that other is only a means to one’s own ends is the necessary 
consequence of a failure of genuine unification of persons.  Use, the failure of 
unification, may have a variety of causes.  It may be caused by the outright denial of the 
other as an equal whose own self-determination should be respected.  It may be caused 
by the adoption of an end which by its nature cannot unify the two persons; the 
subjective good of pleasure is such an end.  It may also be caused by the rejection of 
something belonging to the truth about the other person.  Love depends on truth.163  In 
its absence there can be no real unification of persons.  This is the key to understanding 
Wojtyła’s judgment that artificial contraception, employed for whatever reason by the 
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married couple, is always wrong while periodic continence is not.  In the former case a 
truth about the other is rejected; in the latter this truth is not present, because of the 
woman’s fertility cycle, and so temporally is not even there to be rejected.164 
Here ends our investigation into the personalistic norm.  The importance given to 
this principle in Love and Responsibility is, as mentioned at the beginning of the present 
chapter, easily discernible by any reader.  The norm is absolutely central, and sexual 
morality, in as much as it is treated in Love and Responsibility, is treated from the stand 
point of this norm.  Since the norm in its positive form is “persons are to be loved”, 
there obviously must be some implication for the question of the relationship between 
love and sexuality.  In light of the nature of the norm and the function which it plays in 
the work we may say that love is related to sexuality as a moral demand made of the 
person whenever that person takes as the object of his or her activity a person of the 
opposite sex. 
Three things should be noted about this relation.  First, by making sexual 
morality a question of loving and using another, Wojtyła has done something significant 
with respect to the tradition he is writing in.  While the belief that sexual sins were 
offenses against the person who was the object of the act has been a common element in 
the writings of Catholic personalists like Dietrich von Hildebrand, Herbert Doms and 
Paul Quay,165 in none of them is this idea worked out to the extent that it is in Love and 
Responsibility.  Wojtyła provides a clear philosophic basis for this belief, something 
which is not provided by others. 
                                                
164 The “truth” is more or less fertility or the potential for procreation of the other, but we cannot go into 
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continence can be found in Love and Responsibility, pp 224-44. 
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Second, the norm is indeed the principle which determines the moral value of 
those forms of sexual activity which the work takes up for consideration, but the range 
of these forms is limited.  Wojtyła applies the norm to lust, fornication, contraception 
and adultery.166  In each case the act takes as its object a person of the opposite sex.  
This can hardly be a coincidence.  In an article entitled “The Problem of Catholic Sexual 
Ethics: Reflections and Postulates” which was published five years after Love and 
Responsibility, Wojtyła claims that the proper object of Catholic sexual ethics “is simply 
the relation between persons of the opposite sex, with particular attention to the sexual 
relation.”167  What this means for question of homosexuality and masturbation is not 
explicitly stated, but the implication is clear enough: sexual actions which lie outside of 
the proper object of sexual ethics are immoral by default.  In Love and Responsibility the 
boundary lines are seemingly the same and appear to be related to Wojtyła’s 
understanding of the sexual urge.  The urge normally takes as its object a person of the 
opposite sex; when it is directed toward a person of the same sex, or toward an animal, 
or even toward sexual attributes considered in the abstract, this is due to an 
impoverishment, deviation or perversion of the urge.168  It could be said then that Love 
and Responsibility concerns itself only with what its author judges to be “normal 
immoral acts” within the sexual sphere and not “abnormal immoral” ones.  Regardless 
of the presence of this normal/abnormal distinction within the sexual sphere, the fact 
remains that the moral value of acts such as masturbation and bestiality cannot have the 
                                                
166 Wojtyła treats of lust in the section “The Rehabilitation of Chastity” and fornication, contraception and 
adultery in the section “Marriage”. 
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personalistic norm as their principle since another person is not the object of the act.  If 
immorality in these cases does have something to do with love, this must be due to some 
other factor.  The effect which the norm has on the relationship between love and 
sexuality is thus limited; it does not make love the determining principle of all sexual 
activity, but only of those activities which take another person as their object. 
Third, love is a moral demand made of action in the sexual sphere not because of 
anything specific to sexuality itself, but only because it is the sexuality of the person.  
For the relationship between love and sexuality, therefore, the primary significance of 
Wojtyła’s use of the personalistic norm is that it draws attention to the intermediary 
place occupied by “the person”.  Love, as Wojtyła understands it, is exclusive to 
persons.169  Consequently, there exists a great difference between love’s relation to 
animal sexuality and love’s relation to human sexuality.  Whatever the latter relation 
might be precisely, the most important factor is undoubtedly the intermediary role 
played by the person; human sexuality bears the relationship it does to love primarily 
because it is the sexuality of a person.170 
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170 This is to say that sexuality is something which belongs to or is part of the whole which is the human 
person.  Wojtyła’s understanding of the body-soul relationship never appears to depart from the basic 
view of Thomism.  At one point in Love and Responsibility he says, “A human body is the body of a 
person because it forms a unity of substance with the human spirit.”170 
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Chapter Three: Love 
 
 The intention Wojtyła had in writing Love and Responsibility can be described in 
a variety of ways.  Earlier it was said that the work was written for the pastoral purpose 
of putting “the norms of Catholic sexual morality on a firm basis, a basis as definitive as 
possible”.171  This description is accurate but rather broad.  A more precise 
understanding of the intention can be discerned from something which is said in the 
introduction about the relationship between “the love which is the subject of the greatest 
commandment” and the love “that takes shape between a man and a woman on the basis 
of the sexual urge”.  In a rare criticism of the tradition of Catholic theological treatment 
of sexuality, Wojtyła writes: 
Manuals of ethics and moral theology tend to deal with these two kinds of 
love separately: with the first in discussions of the theological virtues, since 
love is the greatest of these, and with the second primarily within the 
framework of discussion of the cardinal virtue of continence, since sexual 
purity is connected with this.  The result may be a certain hiatus in our 
understanding, a feeling that the second kind of love cannot be reduced to 
the first, or at any rate ignorance of the ways in which this can be realized.172 
 
Often a work is written in response to a need which the author feels has not been 
adequately met by the works of others and often this need is identified in the 
introduction.  Since this is the only criticism of the field of Catholic sexual ethics to be 
found in the introduction, there is good reason to believe that Love and Responsibility 
was written largely with the view to addressing the problem identified 
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here.  Even a cursory reading of the work will vindicate this suspicion.  Almost 
everything that is said is said for the purpose of explaining how one can ensure that a 
sexual love is genuine love. 
 This problem which Wojtyła tries to address is a practical and an ethical one.  
Accordingly so also is the focus of his work; it is practical and ethical, as opposed to 
speculative and metaphysical.  But while the focus is such, all that is said ultimately 
depends on his speculative/metaphysical understanding of the various realities of which 
he speaks, most significantly love, the person and sexuality.  Sometimes, as in the case 
of his analysis the nature of the person, his understanding is made explicit; other times 
one must read between the lines.  In this study we are attempting to determine what the 
relation between love and sexuality is in his thought.  This requires us to draw out much 
of what Wojtyła leaves implicit.  The previous chapter examined the personalistic norm, 
the functional centerpiece of the work.  The norm depended on two terms, person and 
use, and pointed towards a third, love.  It was proposed as the principle by which the 
moral value of sexual actions having another person as its object is to be determined.  
Thus love was related to the sexual sphere as an ethical demand, a demand which 
derives not from the nature of sexuality itself, but rather from the personal nature of 
those involved.  But while we have discovered the primary reason why love is related to 
human sexuality—because humans are persons and “Love is the exclusive portion of 
persons”173—there is a felt need to press the question further.  Human language seems 
to suggest there is some special relationship between love and the sexual relationship 
between a man and a woman.174  In English, for example, there is gravity attached to the 
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phrase “I love you” when used within the context of a sexual relationship which is not 
present when the same phrase is used between relatives.  Does Wojtyła share this 
sentiment?  The emphasis given to marriage in his various pastoral activities, and the 
fact that he wrote his first book on the topic of love and the sexual relationship, suggest 
that he does indeed sense that there is something special here.  Does he have something 
more than a sense?  Does he have a belief as to why such importance is attached to this 
form of love?  This is what we wish to find out and there is perhaps no better way of 
going about this than by examining Wojtyła’s understanding of the two forms of love of 
which he speaks in his introduction. 
 The place to look is the second chapter, “The Person and Love”.  Here, after the 
“The Person and the Sexual Urge” which really serves as a philosophic preamble, 
Wojtyła begins to properly address the problem which he described in his introduction 
as that of “introducing love into love”.175  The chapter is divided into three sections 
which respectively address sexual love from the metaphysical, psychological and ethical 
perspectives.  In the first, the “Metaphysical Analysis of Love”, the love which develops 
between a man and a woman on the basis of the sexual urge is analyzed in terms of its 
constituent parts: attraction, desire, and goodwill; and in terms of the forms which it can 
take and encompass: friendship and betrothed love.  In the “Psychological Analysis of 
Love” the focus is on sensuality and sentimentality.  Sensual emotional reactions are 
declared to be those which take as their object the value of “the body as a possible 
object of enjoyment” and sentimental emotional reactions those which take as their 
object the value of the masculinity or femininity of the other person.  These emotions 
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are judged to be “the raw material of love”.176  Finally in the “Ethical Analysis of Love” 
the necessity of love existing as a virtue in the will is propounded.  For a completely 
genuine love to exist between a man and a woman there must be in each an ever ready 
disposition of the will to assert and respect the personal value of the other. 
 The message of the third section is echoed clearly and consistently throughout 
the rest of the work and so there is less of a need to focus in on it.  The second section 
deserves a little attention.  Here Wojtyła reveals how he understands sexual yearning 
and romantic sentiment to be connected to love.  Strong sensual and sentimental 
reactions to another person do not by themselves qualify as love.  But while such 
reactions do pose a certain danger to genuine love, they are not naturally opposed to it; 
rather they exist as a preparation177 for and a perfection178 of real love.  When the 
personal value of the other is uncompromisingly affirmed, sensual and sentimental 
emotional reactions become an integral part of love.  Wojtyła’s analysis of these 
emotions is fairly detailed and its depth probably owes something to Max Scheler179, but 
as far as we are presently concerned this is all that needs to be pointed out. 
 The first section is by far the most significant for us.  While the focus is clearly 
on the “love between two persons who differ in respect to sex”180, much is 
simultaneously revealed about Wojtyła’s understanding of love in general.  The reason 
for this is the explicit declaration that “[t]he love between man and woman is one 
particular form of love, in which elements common to all of its forms are embodied in a 
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specific way.”181  While the term “love” has a wide range of meanings, Wojtyła does not 
believe that all uses are equally valid.  He believes there is an actually existing reality to 
which the term properly ought to refer.  In the “Metaphysical Analysis of Love” he is 
not concerned with examining the various meanings of the word love when applied to 
the sexual man-woman relationship; he is concerned rather with explaining the various 
aspects and forms which a genuine love between a man and a woman can have.  This 
fact simplifies our task considerably. 
 The section begins with three important claims having already been made about 
love.  These were: 1) “Love is the exclusive portion of persons”182, 2) “Love is the 
unification of persons”183, and 3) “Man’s capacity for love depends on his willingness 
consciously to seek a good together with others, and to subordinate himself to that good 
for the sake of others, or to others for the sake of that good.”184  In the opening 
paragraph of “Metaphysical Analysis of Love” the first and the third, and to some 
extend the second, are reaffirmed: “Let us take as our starting point the fact that love is 
always a mutual relationship between persons.  This relationship in turn is based on 
particular attitudes to the good, adopted by each of them individually and by both 
jointly.”185  Several points can be made about these prior claims and their reaffirmation.  
First, the insistence that love is only possible among persons is found not only here, but 
consistently throughout the entire work.  Wojtyła is very clear on this point.  
Accordingly, when he makes mention of the scholastic tradition of speaking of a natural 
love, an amor naturalis, which is seen in teleological tendencies, and says that to speak 
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of this as love is to speak “in a very broad sense”186, he should not be interpreted as 
meaning that amor naturalis qualifies as genuine love.  Since love is something 
“exclusive” to persons and “always… between persons”, “in a very broad sense” must 
be interpreted to mean “in the sense that it bears a resemblance to real love due to some 
similarity”. 
Second, Wojtyła consistently presents love as something mutual or reciprocal.  
His insistence on reciprocity, however, is different from than that on love being 
exclusive to persons.  Outside of the personal realm, love cannot exist in the proper 
sense of the word.  Reciprocity, on the other hand, is a perfection of love, properly so 
called.  Wojtyła writes: “Love in the individual develops by way of attraction, desire and 
goodwill.  Love however finds its full realization not in an individual subject, but in a 
relationship between subjects, between persons.”187  We also find the statement that 
“love is by its very nature not unilateral but bilateral, something ‘between’ two persons, 
something shared.  Fully realized, it is essentially an interpersonal, not an individual 
matter.”188  The key to understanding reciprocity’s place in love is the definition: “love 
is the unification of persons”.  For love to be considered genuine it must satisfy the 
demands of this definition.  A one-sided love does, but only up to a point; whether we 
are speaking of love in the form of desire, attraction, or goodwill, a strictly “individual 
love” involves a movement of one person towards another and to that degree qualifies as 
a unification between persons.  But the difference in degree between a unification 
effected by a one-sided love and the unification that one finds when love is mutual is so 
great as to effect a difference in kind.  Further, reciprocity is something which love 
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naturally desires.189  When one loves another, one desires that the other return this love.  
According to Wojtyła, this desire is not selfish, but natural “since reciprocity is in the 
very nature of love”.190  So when love remains a one-sided reality, it is not only 
imperfect and incomplete, but also something very unfortunate and painful. 
Lastly, Wojtyła consistently speaks of love in conjunction with a person’s 
“attitude towards the good.”  The appearance of love within the work, it may be 
recalled, coincides with the appearance of the concept “common good”; when two 
persons freely pursue an end which is good for both (hence a common good), their 
relationship becomes one of love rather than use.  The frequent association of love with 
“an attitude towards the good” and the pursuit of a “common good” raises the questions 
of how exactly is love related these two.  Does love’s existence depend on an attitude 
towards the good?  Is this the common good which both are seeking or is it something 
else?  With respect to marriage, is the love embodied there the result of a mutual pursuit 
of the traditional ends of marriage: procreation, mutual assistance and alleviation of 
desire?  The answer to these questions will be very revealing about Wojtyła’s 
conception of love.  They also will serve to bring us to the section “Metaphysical 
Analysis of Love”, for only there can the answer be found. 
Wojtyła divides “Metaphysical Analysis of Love” into roughly two parts.  In the 
first he examines love as it may exist in the individual; in the second, he looks at love as 
it may exist as something mutual between persons. Love may exist in the individual as a 
disposition which regards another person as a good and one of the forms it may take is 
attraction.  Attraction, he claims, is primarily cognitive in structure, though not 
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exclusively: “To be attracted does not mean just thinking about some person as a good, 
it means a commitment to think of that person as a certain good, and such a commitment 
can in the last resort be effected only by the will.”191  Since it depends on the intellect to 
perceive the other as a good, and the will to commit one to this stance, attraction is a 
phenomenon exclusive to the realm of persons.  It is thus spiritual and should be 
distinguished from the emotional-affective responses that often accompany it.  
Attraction is therefore not an emotion, but emotion aids its development and also 
perfects it.  Emotion is a spontaneous reaction to a perceived value, but also in a sense a 
blind one since it cannot judge whether the perceived value actually exists.192  That 
attraction arises so easily between a man and a woman is the result of the sexual urge.193  
The urge particularly disposes a person to view the values connected with the sex of the 
other person as goods.  However, for attraction to be a genuine form of love, it is 
absolutely necessary for it not to be limited to partial values belonging to the person, 
such as the values of sex, but must have a direct relation to the value of the person as 
such.194  If the case were otherwise, attraction could not qualify as a “unification of 
persons” since it would draw a person not to another but merely to an aspect belonging 
to the other. 
At the beginning of his analysis of attraction Wojtyła recalls what he had 
previously said about love being a mutual relationship dependent on a particular view 
towards the good.  Speaking of the man-woman relationship, he says “[t]his attitude to 
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the good originates in their liking for, their attraction to each other.”195  Attraction 
involves a reaction to values found in the other person.  Seemingly, it does not matter to 
Wojtyła what these values are; attraction may encompass any value so long as that value 
is related properly to the chief value present in the person, the value of the person as a 
person.  This proper relation entails that a person must be regarded as valuable because 
of what being a person is; a person must not be regarded as valuable because of the 
other values which inhere in the person.  So what emerges clearly from this is that at the 
early stages of a man-woman relationship, where there are at best two individual loves, 
the good with which love is associated is not something “external”, such as defense of 
the country was in the officer-soldier relationship, but the other person him  or herself. 
Next Wojtyła turns to something which he calls love-as-desire.  “Like 
attraction,” he says, “desire is of the essence of love, and is sometimes the most 
powerful element.”196  He then notes that “[d]esire too belongs to the very essence of the 
love which springs up between man and woman.”197  It is not limited to this 
relationship—love as desire is for example very prominent in a created person’s love for 
God—but is particularly associated with it because maleness and femaleness are an 
imbalance, an incompleteness.  Because sex is a limitation, a “man therefore needs a 
woman, so to say, to complete his own being, and woman needs man in the same 
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196 Ibid. 80.  Whether it is because of Wojtyła’s choice of words or Willett’s translation of them, this 
statement has a certain danger of misinterpretation.  “Desire is of the essence of love” means that desire 
(here being love-as-desire or amor concupiscentia) is a form of love.  The structure of desire is such that it 
contains the essentials necessary for it to be considered as love.  The statement does not mean, by 
contrast, that desire is to be found wherever love is.  “Metaphysical Analysis of Love” is concerned with 
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way.”198  As with attraction, the sexual urge, that “dynamic element intimately 
connected with difference of sex in human persons”199, plays a role; it is through the 
urge that a person feels his or her “objective, ontological need”200 for a person of the 
opposite sex. 
Love-as-desire, or amor concupiscentia as medieval philosophers called it, is not 
to be confused with desire itself, concupiscentia.  Wojtyła is insistent on distinguishing 
the two.  Concupiscentia involves an “awareness of some lack, an unpleasant sensation 
which can be eliminated by means of a particular good.”201  If this were the content of a 
man’s “love” for a woman, if he viewed her primarily as a good by which he would 
satisfy his desire, then his love would be a violation of the personalistic norm.  Love as 
desire, amor concupiscentia, is something different.  It is a longing for the person; the 
desired object is not the values which inhere in the person, but the person in whom the 
values inhere.  The individual’s experience of love-as-desire may be expressed as “I 
want you because you are a good for me”202, but for this to express love-as-desire rather 
than just desire, it is necessary that the other is not being viewed as a mere means to an 
end.  Such an instrumental attitude will occur when the desirable values in the other are 
not firmly “welded” to the value of the person.  
As with attraction, we again find that the good towards which love-as-desire has 
a particular attitude is, and must be, the other person.  And while other aspects may also 
be desired, the sexual aspects of the other person usually play a prominent role since the 
sexual urge can make the objective limitation of one’s sex vividly felt.  But it is the 
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person, and not their sex or anything else about them, which Wojtyła judges to be the 
good which one desires.  If desire were felt solely for the sexual characteristics of the 
other, then this desire would be concupiscentia, not amor concupiscentia, and the other 
person would seen only as a means to an end. 
Finally there is love as goodwill, amor benevolentiae.  Wojtyła writes: “Love 
between man and woman would be evil, or at least incomplete, if it went no farther than 
love as desire… It is not enough to long for a person as a good for oneself, one must 
also, and above all, long for the person’s good.”203  Goodwill is an absolutely necessary 
element of love; without it there can be no genuine love, only egoism.204  It means 
willing the good of the other for the other’s sake.  Goodwill depends on selflessness of 
intention.  It ceases to be genuine when the other’s good is willed as a means to an end.  
This danger particularly exists because of the relation between goodwill and love-as-
desire; when the other is made better (as goodwill wishes), love-as-desire is 
correspondingly increased.  But for goodwill to be genuine, its relation with love-as-
desire must not be viewed as that of a means with an end; rather, love-as-desire must be 
seen as a fruit of goodwill, as an effect overflowing from it.  Goodwill is something 
greater and more unconditional than love-as-desire.  “It is,” says Wojtyła, “the purest 
form of love... [and] does more than any other to perfect the person who experiences 
it”.205 
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While a wide variety of goods may be involved in goodwill—since one may will 
many types of goods for another—all of these are willed only as means to the end which 
is the other person’s good.  Yet again love takes the other person as the good towards 
which it is primarily concerned; other goods enter only in so much as they are connected 
with and subordinated to this good.   
Recalling for a moment the questions which we have sought to answer through a 
review of Wojtyła’s treatment of attraction, love-as-desire, and goodwill, we may note 
that in each of these forms of love the good which one has a certain attitude towards is, 
first and foremost, the person; other goods or values may enter into these forms of love, 
but only if they are put in proper relation to the fundamental good, the person.  This 
seriously challenges the idea that love, as Love and Responsibility conceives it, is in its 
essence a mutual pursuit after a good or that it is derived from the pursuit.  Further, 
while attraction, love-as-desire, and goodwill may be found in any context, Wojtyła has 
the context of man-woman sexual relationship in mind in “Metaphysical Analysis of 
Love”.  It is quite clear, then, that he does not think that the love which develops in a 
man or a woman on the basis of the sexual urge takes its beginnings in an attitude 
towards the ends of marriage; he thinks rather it takes its beginnings in the attitude one 
has for the other person.  This much we can say at present.  Since love is, in its fullness, 
something mutual and shared between persons, we will examine the two forms of 
“interpersonal” love before returning to the questions we are seeking to answer.  These 
two forms of love are friendship and betrothed love. 
Love begins to exist as friendship when the goodwill which two persons have for 
each other is such that each desires the other’s good as much as he desires his own.  
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When this happens, the ‘I’ of the one person and the ‘I’ of the other form a “moral 
unity”.206  The two become one subject with respect to the pursuit and enjoyment of the 
good.  Obviously not all relationships called by the name “friendship” qualify as 
genuine according to Love and Responsibility’s definition; a “friendship” based on 
mutual pleasure, for example, is only so called because of the semblance it bears to the 
real thing.  Among the phenomena frequently confused as friendship, Wojtyła singles 
out one in particular: sympathy.  While not friendship itself, sympathy is very important 
for friendship; sympathy nurtures its development and also perfects it by giving it a 
more vivid subjective presence.207  Wojtyła’s particular understanding of sympathy is 
drawn from the word’s etymology: “experiencing together”.208  Sympathy is a situation 
of emotional unity between two persons.  The two persons may take advantage of the 
situation which sympathy provides and fashion a friendship out of it.209  What they 
should not do is think that it is love itself and leave it at that.  This mistake, says 
Wojtyła, is often made, especially in a man-woman relationship.210 
Also connected to friendship is something which Wojtyła calls comradeship.  
Comradeship is based on “such objective foundations as joint work, common goals, 
shared concerns, etc.”211  Examples of situations which may produce it include: 
attending the same class, working in the same laboratory, working for the same 
company, and having a mutual interest in philately (stamp collecting).212  Comradeship 
is the closeness and sense of unity that results, or can result, from any situation in which 
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two persons find themselves pursuing a common end.  It can aid the development of 
love between a man and a woman.  If it is present and combined with sympathy, the 
chances are good that a true friendship will be formed.213 
As great a union of persons as friendship is, there is something still greater 
according to Wojtyła.  This form of mutual love is “betrothed love”.  It is treated at the 
end of the “Metaphysical Analysis of Love” and is the climax of the section.  The 
essence of betrothed love is total mutual self-giving.  In friendship, the ‘I’ of the other is 
joined to one’s own and a common ‘we’ results which is the vantage point from which 
all goods are viewed.  In betrothed love, the ‘I’ of each person is surrendered to the 
other and each gives his or her self as a possession to the other.  Since betrothed love is 
properly something reciprocal, total mutual self-giving also implies that each receives 
the other person totally.214 
Much more will need to be said about betrothed love.  In the next chapter we 
will give the concept a thorough analysis.  For the present it is necessary only to note 
that the good with which betrothed love is primarily concerned is the person.  The 
person is both the good which is given and the good which warrants the reception of 
such a gift.  No good beyond the person is mentioned as being essentially connected 
with this form of love.  Looking back at the case of friendship, we see something 
similar.  The two friends share a common view towards the good which is the other; 
each sees the other as a good which is of the same value as the good which is oneself.  
Other goods enter the relationship only after this; they are desired for the other because 
the other has been judged to warrant their reception.  So while both friendship and 
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betrothed love are properly forms of love which are shared between persons, their 
attitude towards the good derives from the type of love which the individual contributes 
to its creation.  In the case of friendship this is primarily goodwill.  In the case of 
betrothed love, attraction and love-as-desire seemingly play a more important part than 
they do in friendship; this would be because betrothed love involves not only total self-
giving, but also total receiving of the other. 
So, does Wojtyła believe that the love between a man and a woman in a marriage 
relationship is based on their shared attitude towards procreation, mutual assistance and 
the alleviance of desire, the three ends of marriage listed by him as traditional?215  A 
proper answer to this question must take into account the tension that exists between the 
“Analysis of the Verb ‘To Use’” and the “Metaphysical Analysis of Love”.    In the 
earlier section heavy emphasis is laid on the role that the common good plays in making 
a relationship one of love.  Wojtyła even says that “love between two people is quite 
unthinkable without some common good to bind them together.”216  He then goes on to 
identify procreation, mutual help and the right ordering of desire as the “common 
goods” specific to marriage.217  However, in the latter section, which outlines the 
objective development of love between a man and a woman, no mention is made of a 
common good.  Wojtyła continues to talk about a relationship of love being based on a 
particular attitude towards the good,218 but this good is clearly the other person.  All the 
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other goods which love may encompass depend on their connection to this one primary 
good.  Not only is the concept of the common good not mentioned, but the accounts 
given of friendship and betrothed love seem sufficient in themselves and do not require 
an implicit understanding of a common good. 
This tension can be resolved to some degree.  It can be noted that Wojtyła speaks 
of the common good at a time when he is intent on opposing a utilitarian understanding 
of love.  This understanding holds pleasure to be the mutual goal of a “love” 
relationship.  While such a goal does remove use to some extent—because it has been 
mutually agreed upon—it does not remove it completely.  Pleasure is a subjective 
experience, not an objectively existing good.  It therefore cannot be something 
“between” persons; it is a subjective goal which happens to coincide with that of 
another.  The relationship is thus based on the usefulness which this coincidence 
provides for the pursuit of one’s own unsharable end. 
If we turn again to Wojtyła’s explanation of friendship, we can note that while 
there is no mention of a particular common good which unites the two friends, there is 
an idea that the two share a “communion in the good”.  Because of the attitude each one 
has towards the other as a person, all goods become sharable; what is directly good for 
one, is experienced as a good by both.  There is no specific common good which unites 
the two, but rather the two are united with respect to the good in general.  Friendship 
viewed in this way is the inverse of comradeship.  In comradeship there is first 
something which two persons share in common.  This common task or interest draws 
the two together and provides a situation favorable for friendship.  In friendship there is 
first a communion of persons, then an interest in goods other than those persons.  
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Friendship and comradeship therefore start, as it were, from different ends of the 
spectrum: the former beginning with an attitude towards the other person which 
consequently leads to a joint attitude towards the other’s good, the latter beginning with 
an attitude towards a specific good which consequently leads to an encounter with the 
other person.  Importantly, friendship is declared to be love but comradeship is not; the 
difference obviously lies in that the essence of comradeship does not specify the attitude 
one has towards the other person as person. 
In light of all this it would seem that love, as Love and Responsibility 
understands it, bears a necessary connection to the common good, but this connection is 
something secondary, a consequence flowing from the essence of love, rather than being 
of the essence itself.  Love is in essence the unification of persons.  In its interpersonal 
existence, love is what exists between two people uniting them as persons; in its 
individual existence, it is what is in a person drawing him or her toward the person of 
another.  The “Metaphysical Analysis of Love” confirms this; if unification of persons is 
understood as the definition of love then it makes sense why both love-as-desire and 
goodwill can both be considered to be love even though from a certain perspective they 
are opposed to each other.  By contrast, “Two persons pursuing a mutually chosen 
common good”, is never proposed as a definition of love and it certainly cannot be used 
to make sense of how attraction, love-as-desire and goodwill are all forms of love.  The 
“Metaphysical Analysis of Love” indicates that love depends primarily on an attitude 
toward the other person.  If we take this as our starting point, we can look back on 
“Analysis of the Verb ‘To Use’” and see that the beginnings of love occur in the case 
where two people adopt and pursue a common good, not because of the common good 
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itself, but because by mutually adopting it, rather than one adopting it and imposing it 
on the other, there is an implicit affirmation of the value of the person.  This affirmation 
of the other as one who is equal to oneself with respect to desired good, is the reason 
why love, even if in a very minimal form, can be said to be present. 
What all this means for the relation between married love and the ends of 
marriage is this: married love, in as much as it is love, derives not from the mutual 
attitude towards the ends of marriage, but from the attitude each has towards the other; 
their mutual attitude towards these ends comes from their mutual attitude towards each 
other.  This being said, we should not forget that Wojtyła links married love with the 
goods of marriage in a way which he does not link it to any other common goods.  He 
views the love between the two as depending, in a way not to be confused with the 
dependency explained above, on their attitude towards these goods; if they reject these 
goods, love cannot be said to exist between them.   
Given the preceding review of “Metaphysical Analysis of Love”, a summary of 
Wojtyła’s understanding of love as present in Love and Responsibility should be easily 
attainable.  Love is, in its metaphysical essence, the unification of persons.  It is 
exclusive to persons and is bound up with the specifically personal powers of intellect 
and will.  It is dependent on the attitude which a person adopts towards the good.  This 
good is, first and foremost, the person.  Love always affirms the goodness of the other 
person, and it is from this affirmation that it is then able to draw other goods into its 
orbit.  In the case of attraction these goods are the values which inhere in the person, in 
the case of love-as-desire those values which are good for oneself, and in the case of 
goodwill those which one judges to be good for the other person.  While love has its 
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foundations in the attitude which the individual adopts towards the truth and goodness 
of the other, it reaches its objective perfection only when it is reciprocated and becomes 
something which exists, as it were, between the two persons. 
Love also has a subjective profile.  This profile consists in emotional reactions to 
values perceived in the other.  These reactions favor the development and are often 
referred to by Wojtyła as the “raw material of love”.  They also perfect it by giving it 
subjective vividness and “warmth”.  Emotional-affective reactions are an important part 
of love, but they can only be part of it if love in its metaphysical reality is present and if 
the reactions are properly integrated.219  No amount of emotion can substitute for the 
affirmation of the person effected by the intellect and will. 
Does Wojtyła’s understanding of love suggest some special relation between 
love and sexuality?  If one considers love as it may exist in the individual, love as 
attraction and desire stand out as having great potential to be affected by a person’s 
sexual nature.  Love-as-desire is based on an objective need and sexuality provides such 
a need.  Sex is “a limitation, an imbalance”220 and “[a] man therefore needs a woman, so 
to say, to complete his own being, and woman needs man in the same way.”221  Not only 
does sexuality furnish an objective need, it also makes it “keenly felt” thanks to the 
sexual urge.222 Because of the place sex has in the objective make up of a human being 
and because of the intensity of the sexual urge, it is most likely that Wojtyła sees the 
sexual love between a man and a woman as the exemplar of this form of love.  To a 
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lesser degree something similar may be said about love as attraction.  Among the 
different types of human relationships, the man-woman relationship stands out because 
of the ease with which love as attraction occurs in that relationship.  This ease according 
to Wojtyła is due to the sexual urge.223  The emotional reactions which attraction 
encompasses help create sympathy and this in turn can foster friendship.   
If we consider love as it may exists between persons, betrothed love stands out 
as bearing some important association with sexuality.  The name itself suggests this.  
This relationship will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Human Sexual Nature 
 
 Up to this point our focus has largely been on love.  With the exception of the 
sexual urge mentioned at end of the last chapter, not much has been said about sexual 
nature itself.  The decision to pursue matters in this way, with love being examined 
before sexuality, was not arbitrary.  At the beginning of “Metaphysical Analysis of 
Love” Wojtyła states, “Love between man and woman is one particular form of love, in 
which elements common to all of its forms are embodied in a specific way.”224  Implicit 
in this is one of the basic assumptions of the work: love may exist independently of 
sexuality.  This independence signifies that love, if Love and Responsibility is to be 
consistent, should bear no essential relation to sexuality and that one should be able to 
arrive at an understanding of it without reference to, or even knowledge of, sexuality, 
however enlightening such a reference and knowledge might be. 
The same is not the case with sexuality’s relation to love.  Late in the work 
Wojtyła associates sexual intercourse with betrothed love: “Marital intercourse is in 
itself an interpersonal act, an act of betrothed love”.225  The statement is decisive.  It 
shows that the author does not believe sexuality to be understandable solely from an 
empirical-scientific perspective, or even from a philosophical one which both assumes 
such scientific knowledge and takes into account the existential significance of 
procreation.  Rather he believes that just as sexual morality must be understood in 
connection with love, so too must sexual nature itself be thus understood.  This will be 
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the guiding principle for our inquiry into Love and Responsibility’s understanding of 
sexuality. 
The proper place to begin is with Wojtyła’s basic philosophic anthropology, 
which from all appearances involves no significant departures from traditional Christian 
philosophy.  “A human body,” he writes, “is the body of a person because it forms a 
unity of substance with the human spirit.”226  Sex is an attribute of the body and has its 
origin there, not in the human spirit, however much it might influence a human 
psychological or spiritual life.  Wojtyła does not state this explicitly in Love and 
Responsibility but it may be assumed because 1) this was the common view of the 
Christian philosophic tradition, the opposite being rare or even unheard of, and if he 
held that opposite view, he would have most likely made an effort to argue for it, which 
he does not, 2) he is generally, or even exclusively, a Thomist when it comes to 
metaphysics and Thomas gives no indication that he believes sex originates and inheres 
in the human spirit, but quite the opposite, and 3) in the series of Wednesday addresses 
which make up Theology of the Body he states that male and female “are two ways of 
being a body”.227  Sex therefore is understood as a bodily reality which is at the same 
time a reality of the person, since the body is an essential attribute of that substantial 
unity which is the human person. 
It seems likely that a Thomistically minded person like Wojtyła would hold that 
the full understanding of a given thing is impossible apart from a recognition of its 
participation in the substance (assuming it is not itself the substance) in which it exists.  
This is in fact the way that Theology of the Body approaches the body: the relation 
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which the body bears to the person is what reveals the body’s ultimate significance.  
From such a perspective it would be erroneous to think that the full significance of 
human sexuality can be discovered by the empirical sciences alone, without there being 
any question of what it means to the person as a whole.  That Love and Responsibility 
does indeed see the contributions of science as being insufficient in themselves for 
providing a complete understand of sexuality—as they are likewise insufficient with 
respect to the determination of sexual morality228—is confirmed by Wojtyła’s claim that 
sexual intercourse is an act of betrothed love229 and his insistence that the sexual urge 
has an “existential” significance rather than a merely biological one.230 
Acknowledging the limitations of empirical science is, for Wojtyła, a 
prerequisite for making proper use of it.  This is especially necessary when dealing with 
issues of sexuality because here scientific knowledge does play a very crucial role; sex 
is, after all, a “bodily reality”.  The importance which Wojtyła attributed to the 
contribution of the sciences can be seen at least as far back as the time when he set up 
Krakow’s first marriage preparation program.  In its second year he invited lay doctors 
and nurses to help him run it.  This was “a bold pastoral stroke in its time.”231  In Love 
and Responsibility, despite the reminders that science is not sufficient in itself, he 
devoted an entire chapter to the bearing which the findings of “sexology” have on 
marital ethics.  Originally, this was an appendix and apparently there was suggestion 
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that the author remove it, presumably because the subject matter was unfitting for a 
priest to discuss; Father Henri de Lubac “strongly emphasized” that it be retained.232 
Thus Love and Responsibility clearly considers scientific knowledge important 
and, at times, even necessary for the determination of the morality of an action, as is the 
case with the use of periodic continence which will be discussed later.  “Sexology and 
Ethics” indicates that Wojtyła was well informed about the “sexology” of his day.  We 
may assume that what was known then was basically equivalent to what is known at the 
time of the composition of the present study, roughly forty-six years later.  While the 
field has undoubtedly advanced in some respects, there has been no major discovery 
comparable to that of the ovum in 1827 and those concerning the human female fertility 
cycle in 1930.  Perhaps the only area that demands some attention is that of fertility 
symptoms.  Early discoveries about the fertility cycle led to the development of the so 
called “rhythm method”, but because the irregularity of the cycle found between 
different women and also between different cycles of the same woman, it was often 
inaccurate.  In the years that followed various indicators of fertility/infertility were 
discovered, most notably changes in the viscosity of vaginal mucous, the basal body 
temperature, and to a lesser extent the position of the cervical head.  At the time Wojtyła 
was writing he was probably at least familiar with the first two of these.  At one point he 
comments that “there exist objective scientific methods known to biology and medicine 
which help us to determine the moment of ovulation, i.e. the beginning of the fertile 
period”233 and so indicates that his understanding of methods of periodic continence 
extends beyond the simple rhythm method. 
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Almost all that Wojtyła says about human sexuality presupposes a basic 
biological knowledge of it.  This knowledge specifically includes: the anatomical 
differences between male and female, the biological nature of sexual intercourse, the 
role of sperm and ovum in reproduction, and the existence of the female fertility cycle.  
The only aspect of human sexuality to which Wojtyła feels it necessary to devote an 
extensive analysis is the sexual urge.  The motivation for doing this seems to be that 
although it may be a phenomenon subject to scientific inquiry, its significance is not 
limited to the biological or even psychological sphere.  The first reason for this, and the 
one which Wojtyła is most explicit about, is the nature of the ultimate end to which the 
urge is directed.  This end is procreation, the continuance of the species homo, and it is a 
good of no small importance, but is in fact the primary good, for in order to possess any 
other good a given thing must possess the good of existence.  Because its end is 
existence, the sexual urge has not merely a biological character but an existential one.234  
“Existence itself,” writes Wojtyła “is a subject for philosophy, which alone concerns 
itself with the problem of existence as such.  An overall view of the sexual urge… is 
therefore the prerogative of philosophy.”235  We may assume that for Wojtyła the 
ultimate conclusion that philosophy can arrive at when it examines the relation between 
the urge and its end, is what is already held by Christian faith, that the sexual urge calls 
one to participate in God’s continuing work of creation.236  If we take this and apply it to 
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sexuality as a whole, we can say that for Love and Responsibility sexuality represents a 
potential for co-work with God in creation. 
If we were to look only at the ultimate end of the urge, procreatio, we would not 
discover the urge to bear any an intrinsic relation to love.237  However, the dynamism of 
the urge involves not only a direction to its final end, but also to the means by which this 
end is to be achieved.  Generally, however, the sexual urge is not experienced as an urge 
towards procreation.  While its objective end may be procreation, its direct object, 
according to Wojtyła, is “a human being of the opposite sex.”238  In identifying this as 
the urge’s direct object, he rejects other possibilities such as “the psychological and 
physiological attributes of the other sex as such”239 and sexual pleasure.240  The sexual 
urge draws one towards another concrete person, not masculinity/femininity or the 
possibility of pleasure, and for this reason bears a relation to love.  Love as understood 
by Love and Responsibility is the “unification of persons” and may be said to exist, in 
the individual at least, whenever one person is drawn toward another spiritually, that is 
by the activity of intellect and will.  While the force which the urge exerts on the person 
(drawing him or her to another) does not qualify as love, since the drawing is not the 
result of the spiritual powers of intellect and will, it nevertheless provides a great 
potential for love because its direct object is identical with that of love.  With the person 
itself being the object, the sexual urge, because it furnishes a vivid experience of the 
value of the sexual attributes of the other person241 and the incompleteness which the 
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difference of sex entails242, provides excellent material out of which love as attraction 
and love-as-desire may respectively be formed.  It is with respect to this that Wojtyła’s 
statement that “love grows out of the sexual urge and develops on that basis and in the 
conditions which the sexual urge creates in the psycho-physiological lives of concrete 
people”243 is to be understood. 
Far more attention is given to the sexual urge than to the sexual differences 
between men and woman.  Sexual differences are touched upon here and there, but 
Wojtyła gives the impression that he sees knowledge about them as being the 
prerogative of psychology and physiology.  He does for instance speak about the 
psychological difference in the experience of intercourse where the man may be more 
inclined to experience it as conquest or possession and the woman as surrender.244  But 
when he does draw attention to this the purpose is not to claim that things are such, but 
to say that even if they are, the reality is that this is equally an act of self-surrender for 
both.  There is, however, one aspect of sexual difference which is ascribed a philosophic 
significance; it was briefly mentioned at the end of the last chapter.  Wojtyła states at 
one point that “Sex is also limitation, an imbalance”245 and this clarifies what he says 
earlier in the section on the sexual urge.  There he speaks of how the sexual urge can 
make one feel a keen need to “supplement [one’s] own attributes with those of a person 
of the other sex” and how “[i]f man would look deeply enough into his own nature 
through the prism of that need it might help him to understand his own limitation and 
inadequacy, and even indirectly, what philosophy calls the contingent character of 
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existence (contingentia).”246  Sex, maleness or femaleness, is an attribute of the person 
which signifies a certain lack of and need for the opposite sex; each considered in itself 
is something incomplete.  But a human person’s “self-insufficiency” or “self-
incompleteness” is rooted much deeper than in its sex; ultimately it originates in the 
person not being his or her own cause of existence.247  Sex, being a limitation, serves a 
positive function for the human person in that it signifies the profound reality that he or 
she is a creature whose existence derives from a creator. 
While need and inadequacy are not essential to love, since God loves without 
having an inadequacy that he is thereby fulfilling, they are significantly tied to it.  Love 
is always a movement of one person towards another and self-insufficiency is often a 
cause for this.  The limitation of sex, while it contains something negative itself, is 
something positive for the person as a whole for it prompts the person to move beyond 
the boundaries of his or her self and seek another, and provided the personalistic norm is 
not violated this movement is love.  Love, it must be recalled, is not merely an ethical 
norm but also a fulfillment of the person.248 
If one looks at the whole of the work, these reflections about sexual difference 
appear as mere side-comments.  The focus in the first three chapters is on the sexual 
urge which even in discussion of the contingent character of sex take precedence since it 
is through the urge that the limitations of sex impinge on the consciousness of the 
subject.  There are probably multiple reasons why Wojtyła gives so much attention to 
the urge.  It was mentioned above that the end of the urge has an “existential”, hence 
philosophical, significance and so needs to be rescued from the common merely 
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biological interpretation.  Another probable reason is that the urge, as compared to 
sexual differences, is more directly tied to morality since it is the urge with which a 
person must contend in his or her inner conscious life, motivating him or her towards 
actions which may or may not be in conflict with certain values.  Also, the choice to 
center the treatment in this way reflects something which is said in one of Wojtyła’s 
articles “The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics” written five years later.  He asks 
“whether only actions connected with the sexual relation (sexual intercourse) itself, 
including all that leads up to or results from it, are the material object of sexual ethics or 
whether this object is simply the relation between persons of the opposite sex, with 
particular attention to the sexual relation”249 and then decides for the latter.  When it 
comes to relationships between persons of the opposite sex the sexual urge is a factor 
which must be contended with in a wide variety of cases, far beyond those of sexual 
intercourse; it makes sense then that so much attention is given to it in Love and 
Responsibility.   
But if it is the relationship between persons of opposite sexes, and not sexual 
intercourse itself, which is the object of sexual ethics in general and Love and 
Responsibility in particular, intercourse nevertheless plays a decisive part.  Most of what 
Wojtyła has to say about it is reserved for the fourth chapter, “Justice Towards the 
Creator”.  The essential statement made there has already been mentioned: “Marital 
intercourse is… an act of betrothed love”.250  For the sake of clarity the term marital 
intercourse is used here rather than sexual intercourse.  Very often Wojtyła employs the 
latter but intends it to be understood within the context of a marriage.  This context is 
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important; outside of marriage sexual intercourse in not an act of love, but an act of 
use.251  The reason for this is that the presence of love or its opposite depends on the 
attitude which persons adopt towards each other.  Marriage signifies a certain attitude—
the only one which, according to Wojtyła, “justifies”252 sexual intercourse.  This attitude 
is betrothed love and it is the essence of marriage.  A relationship of betrothed love is 
one in which two persons “give themselves each to the other.”253  Marriage is such a 
relationship.  Wojtyła expresses this in a variety of ways.  He writes that “the institution 
of marriage [is one] in which two people belong each to the other”254, that there is a 
“reciprocal gift of self implicit in the institution of marriage”255, that “[t]he love of two 
persons, man and woman, leads in matrimony to their mutual dedication one to the 
other”256, that “[f]rom the point of view of each individual person this is a clear 
surrender of the self to another person, while in the interpersonal relationship it is 
surrender of each to the other”257, and that “what happens in the marital relationship is 
that the man simultaneously gives himself [as the woman likewise gives herself to him], 
in return for the woman’s gift of herself to him.”258  That Wojtyła does indeed see this 
love as the essence of marriage rather than something following from it is confirmed by 
the following statement: “The inner and essential raison d’être of marriage is not simply 
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eventual transformation into a family but above all the creation of a lasting personal 
union between a man and a woman based on love.”259 
Sexual intercourse considered apart from the attitude of the persons engaging in 
it can never be determined to be an act of betrothed love, or of any love for that matter.  
Love is in essence something spiritual, something dependent on the spiritual powers of 
intellect and will.  Without betrothed love existing on the “spiritual level” there can be 
no question of a physical act of intercourse being one of love.  This line of logic raises 
an intriguing question: Is it more accurate to say that marriage morally justifies 
intercourse or that betrothed love does?  What has been said so far indicates that the 
answer would be the latter and yet if this were so it would seem that intercourse should 
be morally acceptable outside marriage provided there is betrothed love.  To begin 
solving the problem at issue here it is necessary to recognize that Wojtyła firmly holds 
that for sexual intercourse “marriage is the only proper place”260 and that he is equally 
firm in holding that some acts of intercourse between married persons, such those in 
which artificial birth control are used, are not morally justified and not acts of love.  The 
logical consequences are respectively that marriage alone is not enough to justify 
intercourse and that the betrothed love which does justify it is not possible outside 
marriage. 
This forces us to take a closer look at betrothed love.  What sorts of relationship 
would Wojtyła see as possessing betrothed love?  What is its range?  These questions 
are in effect proposed in Love and Responsibility.261  Attention is brought to several 
types of relationships: mother-child, doctor-patient, teacher-pupil, and pastor-parish.  
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Wojtyła leaves aside the first and says that in the others the question of “how far 
genuine dedicated love is involved is no easy matter” and that even if the relationship 
did “resemble a complete surrender of the self and so establish[] its claim to be love, it 
would still be difficult to apply the name ‘betrothed love’ to it.”262  The mother-child 
case is never subsequently taken up and so while Wojtyła does say, “As for the 
particular manifestations of this form of love, they can I think, vary greatly”263, he does 
not give a very clear answer to the question he proposes.  Fortunately, he does provide 
enough material for us to derive from it something of an answer.  After speaking of the 
above relationships, he states that “[t]he concept of betrothed love implies the giving of 
the individual person to another chosen person”264 and then associates this form of love 
with “the relationship between man and God”265 and marriage, in connection with which 
“[w]e have also the best possible grounds for speaking of betrothed love”.266  While it is 
quite likely that Wojtyła understands the relationship between a person and God as the 
archetype of the love in which one person gives oneself to another, the choice to call this 
form of love betrothed love signifies that the marriage relationship holds a special place 
with respect to this love.  The most probable explanation is that among the various 
human relationships possible in this world, none is more, by its nature, apt to convey the 
reality of betrothed love than is the marriage relationship.  Put another way, marriage is 
the natural “educator” of betrothed love. 
It seems that Wojtyła sees the association of various relationships to betrothed 
love as existing on a spectrum.  At one end there is the marriage relationship which is 
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most definitely a genuine form of betrothed love.  Where exactly on the spectrum the 
expression betrothed love is applied on the basis of mere similarity, rather than of proper 
analogical relationship, is difficult to determine.267  The best that we can do is point out 
some perfections which a given relationship may be lacking in comparison to marriage.  
Reciprocity is one such perfection.  While it is certainly possible to love one’s enemies 
in terms of Wojtyła’s explanation of love, it is a greater thing when one’s enemy ceases 
to be an enemy and loves one in return.  Without reciprocity something is lacking in the 
“objective fullness”268 of love.  When we consider the mother-child relationship it must 
be admitted that while dedicated love may be present to a great degree, this love is to be 
found only in the mother’s attitude towards the child who at present is incapable of 
returning it.  Another perfection is permanence.  The human person is a being whose 
existence is extended through time.  Self-giving is lacking in something when it is 
intended only for a set period of time or only for as long as it is desirable.  Marriage 
from the Church’s perspective must possess the perfection of permanence; a real 
marriage comes into being only if the man and the woman both intend it to be 
permanent.  The same is true with the intention for exclusivity; if either the man or the 
woman enters into the “marriage” without the intention of being faithful, there is no 
marriage.  While marriage as an institution may be said to impose exclusivity on a 
                                                
267 Thomistic language is employed here for precision and also for the purpose of remaining close to 
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with the term love.  According to Wojtyła love in the proper sense of the word can only be applied to 
interpersonal relationships.  If one were to speak of love between two animals, or even a person’s love for 
an animal, the word would necessarily be used in a loose or improper sense. 
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couple, exclusivity does not originate from something outside but rather from the love of 
the couple.  Exclusivity is a perfection of betrothed love.  If in this form of love one 
makes oneself the possession, the “property”269, of the other, there is inevitably a 
lessening of the self-giving when one gives oneself to more than one person; in that case 
it is more accurate to say that possession is divided rather than shared. 
That exclusivity and permanence are perfections of betrothed love is never 
explicitly stated in Love and Responsibility.  What is said is that monogamy and 
indissolubility are demanded by the personalistic norm in a marriage relationship.270  
Since marriage is identified with betrothed love271, monogamy and indissolubility, and 
the exclusivity and permanence they respectively imply, are seemingly associated with 
this form of love as aspects necessary for its completion.  While it is possible to object 
that exclusivity and permanence might be consequences not of betrothed love itself but 
rather  of the context of sexuality in which betrothed love is operating, it is not hard to 
show why, as was just done above, these aspects agree with the nature of betrothed love 
and how their absence makes this love something less than it could be.  Admittedly there 
is a difficulty with exclusivity, for Wojtyła seems to suggest that all persons ought to 
have a betrothed love for God272 and yet he is very clear that betrothed love ought to 
exist between married couples.  I think it is possible to overcome this difficulty and I 
believe the answer can be found in the concept of “loving others in God”, but here is not 
the place to take up such an involved question.  While the matter is still open for 
discussion, I believe that there are sufficient grounds for seeing exclusivity and 
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permanence as perfections of betrothed love.  In addition to what has been said, there is 
also Wojtyła’s treatment of consecrated virginity in which he locates its value in the way 
it expresses that a person belongs first and foremost to God.  In this, the exclusivity 
found in the choice to refrain from the betrothed love implicit in a married relationship, 
adds something to one’s betrothed love for God, if perhaps only in a symbolic way, and 
so is arguably a perfection. 
 There is one final, possible perfection of betrothed love to which we must draw 
our attention: bodily giving and receiving.  Love and Responsibility is not explicit about 
it and we may initially arrive at it only through philosophic reflection.  The hypothesis 
which is produced by such reflection must then be tested to see whether the text 
indicates agreement or disagreement and whether such an idea makes sense of what is 
said.  We begin by proposing the possibility of betrothed love between two men, or two 
women, in which the previously proposed perfections of reciprocity, permanence and 
exclusivity are all present.  How does such a relationship compare with marriage?  Are 
there any ways in which a married relationship might more perfectly embody that love 
in which two persons give themselves totally to each other?  Love, if we accept Love 
and Responsibility’s interpretation of it, is essentially a spiritual matter, and between 
two men there seem to be no obstacles on the spiritual level.  However, a person is not 
spirit alone; if he is not exclusively a body, at least he is one in some important way.  
The betrothed love possible between a man and a woman seems to excel that between 
two persons of the same sex in that giving and receiving and the consequent unity is, for 
the former couple, able to exist on the physical level in a way which is not possible for 
the latter. 
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The difference lies in the possibility for sexual intercourse.  In intercourse two 
bodies unite in a way designed by nature for the facilitation of the biological function of 
reproduction.  Here two bodies are unified in terms of spatial proximity (closeness), of 
inherent design (i.e. the bodies in as much as they are male and female are intended for 
sexual union by nature), and of working together towards the common goal of 
reproduction.  This degree of bodily union is not possible between two persons of the 
same sex.  There may indeed be some sort of bodily giving and receiving in organ or 
blood donation and physical union in the case of Siamese twins, but in such cases 
giving, receiving and union are accidental with respect to the nature of the body.  In 
general, union in terms of physical closeness is all that is obtainable between two bodies 
of the same sex.  Since betrothed love implies total giving of the self and the human 
person is body and spirit, it would seem to follow that among human persons betrothed 
love is most perfect where there is both spiritual and physical union, and that sexuality 
facilitates this perfection of betrothed love. 
What matters here is not that this proposed hypothesis is philosophically valid, 
but whether or not it is a line of reasoning likely to underlie Love and Responsibility’s 
understanding of sexuality and betrothed love.  We will take this question up shortly, the 
answer obviously being very relevant to the relationship between love and sexuality.  
Before doing so we should recall the problem proposed earlier about betrothed love and 
marriage.  The text of Love and Responsibility declared that the fact of being married is 
not enough to justify sexual intercourse and that outside marriage there is no intercourse 
which is morally justified.  We asked whether betrothed love was what justified 
intercourse and to this we must now respond that it is indeed this love which justifies it, 
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but only when understood in a certain sense.  Love and Responsibility says that outside 
marriage intercourse is necessarily immoral, but this must be because the entry into 
marriage coincides with the necessary degree of betrothed love.  The love necessary to 
justify sexual intercourse is one which is mutual, permanent, and exclusive.  This is 
basically the definition of marriage.  All that is lacking is the aspect of public 
declaration, but this is not absolutely essential, for the Church recognizes the possibility 
of marriage without public declaration in cases where such declaration is not possible 
(an otherwise deserted island for example).  Logically, what is necessary is the desire or 
intention for public declaration.  According to Wojtyła “[l]ove demands this 
recognition”273.  Without it justice is not fully done.  The easiest to see why this is so is 
to compare terms such as ‘mistress’, ‘concubine’, and ‘kept woman’ on the one hand 
with ‘wife’ and ‘fiancée’ on the other.274  If a man intends his relationship with a 
particular woman to be exclusive and permanent, but does not publicly declare this, then 
in the view of the society which surrounds them the association connected with the first 
set of terms, which is essentially that she is being treated and is letting herself be treated 
as an object of use, will be applied to her.  The contrast between these terms signifies 
that without public declaration of betrothed love, society will justifiably assume that the 
relationship is one of injustice, of two people using each other.  Obviously a genuine 
love will desire that the other person not be seen as a “user of persons” (or a person used 
by another) when he or she is in fact not.  Without public declaration a misinterpretation 
                                                
273 Ibid. 220 
274 Ibid. 
  84
is fostered and injustice is done to the other, and without justice there can be no question 
of love in its proper sense.275 
The betrothed love which justifies sexual intercourse therefore cannot exist 
before marriage because it is what creates marriage.  This resolves the first half of the 
problem.  The second half is solved by the existence of marriage as an institution.  
While marriage is created by betrothed love and is meant to embody it, it cannot 
guarantee the persistence of this love since this depends instead on the wills of the two 
spouses.  What marriage as an institution does “guarantee” are boundaries which 
spouses are not to cross.  While permanence and exclusivity ought to be imposed by the 
love which the spouses have for each other, these aspects must not be violated even if 
love has waned, for then one person would be treated as an object of use.276  The 
institution of marriage is an institution of justice whose particular restrictions 
concerning monogamy and indissolubility exist so that in the sexual relationship, the 
personal value of the other is affirmed and that he or she is not treated as an object who 
can be enjoyed only for as long as one wishes.277  But betrothed love is more than 
permanence and exclusivity; it is a total giving of the self.  There is, therefore, no 
necessary contradiction in saying that only betrothed true justifies (makes just) 
intercourse and that marriage, though created by this love and deriving its structure from 
it, is not enough in itself to ensure that intercourse is morally good. 
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But why are the demands of betrothed love imposed on intercourse in the first 
place?  To argue, as some have done278, that intercourse is a specifically marital activity 
and therefore subject to the demands of the love which produces marriage is to put the 
philosophic cart before the horse.  Wojtyła does not take this approach.  Marriage is 
presented in Love and Responsibility as an institution created in response to sexual 
intercourse.  While it was said above that intercourse is only an act of betrothed love if 
betrothed love exists on the spiritual level between the two persons, this specifically 
applies to the metaphysical (ontological) and ethical perspectives.  From these 
perspectives it is not an act of betrothed love, but this does not necessarily imply that it 
is completely divorced from betrothed love.  To make sense of why Wojtyła believes 
intercourse to be necessarily subject to the demands of betrothed love, I believe it is best 
to begin by looking at his later thought.  In Theology of the Body John Paul II speaks at 
length about the “language of the body”.  The body has a natural language of its own; it 
expresses realities regardless of the will of the person.  In sexual intercourse the body 
speaks the language of total giving of the self and total receiving of the other.279  While 
he does not use the term betrothed love, it can easily be inserted since the above is its 
definition.  Intercourse, then, is an act of betrothed love in the first instance because that 
is the reality which it signifies; the ethical demand that there be betrothed love in the 
spiritual sense exists because otherwise this act would be a lie.  To my knowledge John 
Paul II does not give an explicit explanation as to why intercourse has this language, but 
from two clear themes in the work it is possible to piece together an explanation.  The 
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first is that the body expresses the person, the second that in intercourse there is a “real 
bodily union”280, a genuine two in “one flesh”.281   When John Paul II speaks of the 
body expressing the person, he does not understand the body as one means of expression 
among many, but as the means of expression.  We may say that in the expressive or 
“phenomenological” sense it is the whole person; while a person may be metaphysically 
a combination of body and soul, our experience of another person never touches the soul 
of the other, the invisible element of the person, without passing through the 
intermediary of the body.  If the body is the expression, the symbol, of the whole person 
and sexual intercourse is a union of bodies, a union of persons in the full sense is 
signified.  To put this another way, in intercourse there is a union of bodies which from 
the individual perspective involves the body of oneself being given and the body of the 
other received; if the body is the symbol of the whole person, the giving and receiving 
of the body symbolizes the giving and receiving of the whole person.  Such total giving 
and receiving of the self is the definition of betrothed love. 
If we turn to Love and Responsibility, we can note that the idea that sexual 
intercourse expresses a union of persons, a mutual giving and receiving of the self, is 
essentially taken for granted.  Often Wojtyła feels it necessary to remind his reader of 
the “more or less pronounced tendency to interpret the ‘gift of self’ in a purely sexual, or 
sexual and psychological, sense.”282  He emphasizes that marriage involves a mutual 
surrender and not just “surrender in the physical sense.”283  It seems that the concern is 
not so much that the reader will not associate intercourse with giving and receiving of 
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the person, but that he or she will believe it accomplishes this giving and receiving in 
and of itself.   
The presence of the belief that intercourse involves a “real union of bodies”—
and this recalls what was said earlier about physical union being a possible perfection of 
betrothed love—is easier to establish.  Wojtyła does not hesitate to refer to intercourse 
as that in which “[a] man and a woman can become ‘one flesh’”.284  He also comments 
that “marriage is not only a spiritual but also a physical and terrestrial union of persons” 
and that “spiritual union can and should continue even when physical union is at an 
end.”285  But as for other possible forms of physical union and a comparison between 
them and sexual intercourse, he is silent.  This silence, however, is most likely the result 
of the assumption that, from a purely philosophical, that is, natural perspective,286 there 
are no other forms of bodily union.  I would find it very difficult to imagine Wojtyła 
regarding the physical union involved in sodomy as anything remotely comparable to 
sexual intercourse. 
Just before Wojtyła claims that marital intercourse is an act of betrothed love he 
writes that “[m]arital intercourse is, and should be, the result of reciprocal betrothed 
love between spouses, of the gift of self made by one person to another.”287  At another 
point he writes that “there can be no question of a sexual giving of oneself which does 
not mean a giving of the person—and does not come in one way or another within the 
orbit of those demands which we have a right to make of betrothed love.”288  Betrothed 
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love is clearly connected with sexual intercourse as a moral requirement.  While Wojtyła 
does not make absolutely explicit the reason for this connection, the above explanation, 
that intercourse has its own “language” provides not only a possible answer, but also 
one which is likely because 1) it helps make coherent sense of his thought, 2) it is 
partially supported by more overt expressions of his thought found in Love and 
Responsibility, and 3) it is derived from what he says in a later work.  While there is 
good reason to believe that this idea underlies what Wojtyła says about intercourse, I 
think it would be important to add that the idea was probably not clearly formulated in 
his mind.  If the idea was clearly formulated, it is hard to see why, considering its value 
from a philosophic perspective, he would have chosen to remain silent about it. 
Connected with all this, and specifically related to what was said earlier about 
sexual intercourse as a perfection of betrothed love, is one final aspect of intercourse 
which Love and Responsibility is fairly clear about.  After speaking of this act as one in 
which “[a] man and a woman become ‘one flesh’” Wojtyła adds that this “oneness will 
not be a form of shamelessness but only the full realization of the union of persons, 
which results from reciprocal conjugal love.”289  Elsewhere he writes that “[l]ove is a 
union of persons, brought about in this instance by physical intimacy and 
intercourse.”290  Concerning the role of intercourse in the creation of a marriage he 
writes that “there can be no doubt that the physical relationship between two people is of 
decisive importance to the institution (hence the old Latin adage matrimonium facit 
copula [intercourse makes a marriage])”.291  The indication from these passages is that 
sexual intercourse not only symbolizes a betrothed union of persons, but also 
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completes/realizes/perfects this union.  In what way does it do this?  Wojtyła does not 
say but the easiest explanation here is probably the most likely and that is that, as 
described above, sexual intercourse allows love, the unification of persons, to extend to 
the physical level and so encompass the human person in his or her totality. 
To summarize, then, we may say that sexual intercourse as understood by Love 
and Responsibility creates a special relation between love and sexuality.  Intercourse is 
meant to be an act of betrothed love and is morally governed by the demands of this 
love.  Since Wojtyła imposes this demand on all acts of intercourse, we are led to 
suppose that there must be some inherent connection between intercourse and betrothed 
love.  A symbolic/expressive relationship seems the reasonable explanation: sexual 
intercourse, which is the union of bodies, expresses/symbolizes love, which is the union 
of persons.  Further, intercourse, provided betrothed love exists on the spiritual level 
between the spouses, serves to fulfill or realize of this love.  Here is it easy to feel as if 
we were on the verge of theology for we have something which is able to accomplish 
what it signifies.  While Wojtyła, at least not in Love and Responsibility, does not pursue 
this line of reasoning, I believe that to view sexual intercourse as the natural sacrament 
of human love would be to remain very much within the spirit of his thought.
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Conclusion 
 
 In 1954 Dietrich von Hildebrand visited the Dominican convent in Salamanca 
with a group of American students.  When the prior recognized his name he asked, “Are 
you this ‘heretic’ who has introduced the dangerous view that love is of essential 
importance in marriage?”292  From the perspective of the upper Church hierarchy, von 
Hildebrand was anything but a heretic; Pius XII, we are told, had informally called him 
a twentieth century doctor of the Church293 and Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger wrote the 
foreword for his biography.294  But the incident reveals an aspect of Church’s twentieth 
century history which is seldom noticed.  The standard division of the Church, 
especially in the post-Vatican II era, into liberal and conservative camps makes it 
difficult to appreciate the enormous differences among the “conservatives”.  While 
Benedict XVI is often regarded by the media as an ultra-conservative, a quick search on 
the internet, at least as of 2006, will reveal that there are a number of people who regard 
him as a liberal heretic, particularly because of his views on ecumenism.  A number of 
people regarded John Paul II in the same way.  The label depends on the one giving it.  
The terms liberal and conservative become useful when they are recognized as being 
relative.  To claim that Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II was a liberal or conservative on 
sexual matters helps understand his role in modern development of doctrine very little; it 
is far more helpful to know what the liberal and conservative forces relative to him were 
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and how he reacted to them.  But in order to know what his place was on this spectrum, 
to know which forces he had to contend with on liberal and conservative sides, it is 
necessary to know what he actually thought. 
 Our study has been limited to Love and Responsibility and to the question of 
how Karol Wojtyła understood love to be related to sexuality.  It has not been a 
complete assessment of his thought on marriage and sexuality; nevertheless, the heart of 
the matter has been examined.  Wojtyła as a philosopher was many things: a humanist, a 
phenomenologist, a Thomist.  But above all else he was a personalist; almost all his pre-
papal writings testify to his intense interest in “the person”.  While some explanation 
may be needed to show why the works of von Hildebrand, Doms or Fuchs ought to be 
categorized as “personalist”, very little is needed for Love and Responsibility; concern 
for “the person” is explicit and dominates the work from beginning to end.  Since 
personalism in the area of sexuality and marriage is generally characterized by concern 
about love, it was fitting to ask of Love and Responsibility what connection love bears to 
sexuality. 
 What was discovered was that human sexuality bears the relation it does to love 
first and foremost because it is the sexuality of a human being, a person.  Love, 
according to Wojtyła, is exclusive to persons.  The sexuality of an animal cannot bear 
the same sort of relation to love as human sexuality does; if there is any relation, it is 
very remote.  Since sex in a human being is the attribute of a person, actions within the 
sexual sphere which take another person as their object must be subject to the moral 
demand governing all interpersonal actions.  This demand is stated by the “personalistic 
norm” which in its positive and simplified form is: persons are to be loved. 
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 Love, from Love and Responsibility’s perspective, is essentially the unification 
of persons.  It is the movement of one person towards another where unification is 
effected primarily through the affirmation of the other’s value as a person.  This 
affirmation must derive from the intellect and will and not from emotional reaction.  
Emotions, which in the sexual sphere may be divided into those which are reactions to 
the other’s body seen as a possible object of enjoyment or those which are reactions to 
the whole person as masculine or feminine, play an important role in love; although they 
do not constitute its essence they help foster it, acting as the “raw material of love”, and 
perfect it by giving it a subjective vividness. 
 Sexuality itself belongs to the “natural order”, but it enters into the “personal 
order” in a variety of ways.  The sexual urge is a dynamic force in the human person and 
has an intensity which is proportionate to the importance of the end for which it exists: 
the existence of the human race.  But because the urge, in order to achieve its ultimate 
end, takes a person of the opposite sex as its immediate object, it enters into the sphere 
of love.  As a means to an end the urge leads a person to desire sexual union with 
another.  This creates a problem: against the blind orientation of the urge is the 
awareness that it is not morally right to treat another person as a mere means to an end.  
The solution is love, the mutual affirmation of the value of the person and the joining 
together of two persons in a common outlook on the goods connected to sexuality.  But 
the sexual urge is not related to love simply as a problem to be resolved by it.  While 
love is not its goal, it necessarily has the effect of leading a person towards love.  Like 
love it takes the person, and not associated values, as its object.  It helps a person 
appreciate the other’s personal value by making associated values especially attractive.  
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Making one keenly feel the inadequacy inherent in sex, it provides the objective basis 
for love-as-desire.  And finally, the urge makes a person desire sexual union with 
another.  Love is the unification of persons and therefore bodily union, made possible by 
the sexual division of the species, becomes a unique potential for love.  Love, an 
essentially spiritual reality, is able to incorporate into itself not only emotion but the 
whole person, body and soul.  Through its natural structure, sexual intercourse becomes 
the expression of betrothed love, the highest form of love in which the self is given to 
the other. 
 While detailed knowledge of Wojtyła’s understanding of love’s relation to 
sexuality is important for interpreting his actions as bishop, cardinal and pope, perhaps 
the most important finding of our study is simply that he had a clear answer to the 
question of how and why the two are connected.  In the context of the modern western 
world it is easy to speak of love and sexuality in the same breath, easy to link them 
together, but it is rare to find conscious reflection on this relation and a reasoned answer 
to whether their relation is necessary or accidental.  A theologian or pope might be 
tempted to make love a part of the discourse on marriage and sexuality simply because 
this is the way the matter has come to be spoken of.  But Love and Responsibility shows 
that Karol Wojtyła did not say what he did simply because it was expected by the 
modern world; right or wrong he came to specific, reasoned conclusions as to why the 
two were related. 
 Wojtyła’s clear conviction about love’s place in the sexual sphere derived from 
his clear conviction about the nature of love.  Just as it is easy to make an unreflected 
association between love and sexuality, it is easy to speak at length about love without 
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having any clear definition of it in mind.  The wide range and haziness of meaning 
which the term love has is perhaps a testimony to its importance in human life, but it is 
also a danger for philosophic discussion when the undefined, mercurial term threatens to 
render everything meaningless.  With the explicit attention given to the nature of love, 
Love and Responsibility represents for the development of personalism in Catholic 
sexual ethics a step in the right direction, at least from the philosophic perspective. 
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Appendix: Timeline 
 1787: Alphonsus Liguori dies. 
1798: Thomas Malthus publishes An Essay on the Principle of Population. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1820: Birth control is publicly advocated in England. 
 
 
 
 
 
1830: Birth control is publicly advocated in the United States. 
 
 
1839: Alphonsus Liguori is canonized. 
 
 
 
 
1852: Theologian John Gury draws from Liguori’s acceptance of Thomas Sanchez 
thesis and argues that the “desire of fostering… friendship” is a licit motive 
for sexual intercourse.  In the 1872 edition “friendship” is replaced with 
“love”. 
 
 
 
1870-1871: Franco-Prussian War 
1871: Alphonsus is declared a Doctor of the Church. 
 
 
1878: A new Malthusian League is formed.  Unlike the earlier, 1860’s Malthusian 
League, this one is proves to be successful. 
 
1880: Pope Leo XIII issues Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae.  The encyclical does not 
deal with contraception directly but rather asserts the holiness of marriage and
the Church’s competence to speak about marriage. 
  96
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1920: Karol Jósef Wojtyła is born on May 18, in Wadowice, Poland. 
 
 
 
1925: Dietrich von Hildebrand gives an important lecture series on marriage.  It is 
published years later as Marriage. 
1927: Von Hildebrand publishes In Defense of Purity [Reinheit und 
Jungfraulichkeit]. 
1930: Despite condemning contraception at previous Lambeth Conferences, the 
Anglican’s 1930 Lambeth Conference on August 14 allows for use of 
contraception in some cases.  Pope Pius XI issues Casti Connubii a few 
month later on December 29 and reasserts the Church’s condemnation of 
contraception. 
1935: Herbert Doms publishes The Meaning and End of Marriage [Vom Sinn und 
Zweck der Ehe]. 
 
 
 
 
 
1946: Karol Wojtyła is ordained a priest. 
 
 
 
1951: Pope Pius XII gives papal support for the regulation of birth through the use 
of the infertile period. 
. 
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1958: Karol Wojtyła is consecrated bishop. 
 
1960: The first Polish edition of Love and Responsibility is published. 
 
1962: The Second Vatican Council begins.  
1963: Karol Wojtyła is named Archbishop of Kraków. 
1964: Vatican II’s Gaudium et Spes is promulgated by Pope Pius VI. 
1967: Karol Wojtyła is made a cardinal. 
1968: Pius VI issues Humanae Vitae.  Controversy ensues.  Dietrich von 
Hildebrand becomes one of its first public defenders. 
 
 
1978: Paul VI dies on August 6.  On August 25 Albino Luciani is elected pope and 
takes the name John Paul I.  He dies some time in the night on September 28-
29.  On October 16 Karol Wojtyła is elected pope and takes the name John 
Paul II.   
1979: September 5, John Paul II begins his “Theology of the Body” series of 
Wednesday addresses. 
1981: November 22, John Paul II issues the apostolic exhortation Familiaris 
Consortio. 
 
1984: “Theology of the Body” ends on November 28. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005: John Paul II dies on April 2.  Joseph Ratzinger is elected pope on April 19 
and takes the name Benedict XVI. 
2005: Benedict XVI’s first encyclical Deus Caritas Est is issued on December 25.
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